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ABSTRACT 
TOWARDS A THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING WITHIN PROBLEM SITUATIONS 
Jose J. Padilla 
Old Dominion University, 2010 
Director: Dr. Andres A. Sosa-Poza 
The concept of understanding is ambiguously used across areas of study, such as 
philosophy and cognitive sciences. This ambiguity partly originates from understanding's 
generally accepted definition of 'grasping' of something. Further, the concept is 
confounded with concurrent processes such as learning and decision making. This 
dissertation provides a general theory of understanding (GTU) that explains the concept 
of understanding unambiguously and separated from concurrent processes. 
The GTU distinguishes between the process of understanding and its outcomes. 
Understanding, defined as a process, is the matching of knowledge, worldview, and 
problem. The outcome of this process is the assignment of a truth value to a problem, 
the generation of knowledge and the generation of worldview. Both accounts say what 
understanding is and what it does. Additionally, a construct of understanding is 
proposed to provide insight into the process of understanding. The construct does not 
only help explain existing theories about understanding, but also adds to the body of 
knowledge by identifying three types of understanding. Two exist in the literature while 
the third type is a contribution of this dissertation. Generalizing from the data it is 
shown how complexity of a problem depends on the effort an individual had to 
understand. It emerges that effort to understand converges to seven levels. 
The theory provides insights in areas of interest to Engineering Management 
such as complexity and complexity's dependence on the observer while differentiating 
understanding from concurrent processes such as learning and decision making. 
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The concept of understanding, although widely used across domains, is described 
differently depending on the area of study. Further, these descriptions, in the majority 
of cases, are based on the informal dictionary definition of 'grasping' something. This 
variety of informal descriptions leads to three problems. First, descriptions do not 
amount to a definition of the concept. Understanding needs to be defined for what it is 
and not for what it does. Second, different descriptions of the term have generated 
ambiguity in its use. This ambiguity leads to the concept being confounded with closely 
related and concurrent processes such as learning and decision making. Finally, these 
descriptions are built under the assumption than an objectively defined and bounded 
problem can be formulated. This assumption breaks down when dealing with 
subjectively defined problems which are common in disciplines such as Engineering 
Management and Systems Engineering or Modeling and Simulation (M&S) . 
In order to provide an unambiguous definition of the concept, a general theory 
of understanding (GTU), from the perspective of an individual, is provided. This theory is 
not only consistent with the state of the art but also differentiates understanding from 
learning and decision making. 
Furthermore, the GTU distinguishes between the process of understanding and 
its outcomes. Understanding, defined as a process, is the matching of knowledge, 
worldview, and problem. The outcome of this process is the assignment of a truth value 
to a problem, the generation of knowledge and the generation of worldview. 
At the core of the GTU is the Understanding Construct (UC). The UC is a 
conceptualization (model) formed by the triple of knowledge, worldview, and problem 
and their possible interactions. Through the UC, the GTU identifies three types of 
understanding. The first, and most common is understanding of knowledge based on 
the application of knowledge. The second type of understanding refers to understanding 
This dissertation uses the APA referencing style 
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a problem based on knowledge formulation. The third type is understanding a problem 
through problem formulation. The first two types of understanding are found in the 
literature as two schools of thought. These two schools of thought do not acknowledge 
the existence of one another and abide by the objectivity assumption. The third type 
was discovered based on the UC proposed in this research. 
The UC paired with proposed definitions were used to build a simulation. 
Simulation is used to generate data and draw insight that contributes to the GTU. Insight 
shows that the mismatch of knowledge, worldview, and problem amount to the effort 
an individual requires to understand a problem. Further, effort to understand, from 
different individuals, converges to seven different levels. Given that some individuals 
require more effort to understand a problem, effort can be considered as a subjective 
measure of complexity. 
1.2 RESEARCH SIGNIFICANCE 
Understanding, according to Franklin (1981), is one of the few terms so widely 
employed that as a word, we understand it, yet it is so little examined in contemporary 
English-speaking philosophy. Nickerson (1985) contends that a fundamental limitation 
on our ability to assess understanding stems from the difficulty we encounter in trying 
to define the concept in a satisfactory manner. Nickerson states that until any definition 
is developed, researchers are going to have difficulties even establishing methodologies 
to determine the degree of understanding attained in a particular instance. 
De Regt and Dieks (2005) state that if the epistemic aim of science is to generate 
factual knowledge of natural phenomena; the epistemic aim of understanding is to be 
able to use that knowledge, in the form of theories, to derive predictions and 
descriptions of the phenomenon. In other words, the importance of understanding to 
science relies on the ability to use the theories one possesses. 
Based on Franklin (1981), Nickerson (1985), and De Regt and Dieks (2005) 
accounts, the study of the concept of understanding has major implications on any area 
where the concept is used. Moreover, its impact on science is also of major 
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consequence when referring to the use of theories. However, its significance to 
Engineering Management (EM) needs to be established. 
A definition of what EM is or does as a discipline is still being formed. Lannes 
(2001) explains that EM is a twofold discipline focusing on managing engineering 
projects and applying engineering to management. Kotnour and Farr (2005) describe EM 
as a bridge between engineering and management. This bridge has, according to 
Kotnour and Farr, five core processes: strategic management, project management, 
systems engineering, knowledge management, and change management. There are 
areas of interest that are common to EM's core processes. Some of the most important 
areas of interest for engineering managers are complexity, learning, decision making, 
and problem solving. Yet, a common factor pervasive in all these areas that is of 
importance to EM is the concept of understanding. 
In the study of complexity, Flood and Carson (1993, p. 24) state that "in general, 
we associate complexity with anything we find difficult to understand." Klir (1985) 
concurs with this position and states that "in addition to the common sense 
characterization of the degree of complexity as the number of interrelated parts, it also 
has a somewhat subjective connotation since it is related to the ability to understand or 
cope with the thing under consideration." This dependence on the individual to seeing 
problems as complex extends to engineering management and systems engineering. 
This is because in most cases decisions are made by a group of stakeholders. 
When it comes to learning, problem solving, and decision making, the concept of 
understanding is also highlighted by different authors. In terms of learning and decision 
making, the process of understanding can be considered as the one that benefits the 
most with learning while contributing to decision making. Sterman (1994) remarks that 
we use learning to revise our understanding of the world and in so doing we affect the 
decisions we make. Perkins (1988) supports the idea of action supported by 
understanding by suggesting that we act out of our understanding of an activity. Nair 
and Ramnarayan (2000, p. 308) extend this position to problem solving by noting that 
"the definition of the initial state would reflect the individuals' understanding of the 
4 
nature of the problem at the beginning, and the desired end-state would be described 
as the goal expected to be achieved by solving the problem." 
Figure 1 shows how understanding contributes to these core processes by 
contributing to shared common areas of interest. 









































































Figure 1. Understanding as a Common Thread in Engineering Management 
Areas of 
Interest 
Considering that the concept of understanding is of significance to Engineering 
Management, the following sub-section presents the proposed problem statement and 
research question. 
1.3 PROBLEM STATEMENT AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
The concept of understanding is described differently in varying contexts which is a 
consequence of the absence of a general theory of understanding. Consequently, a 
theory of understanding that explains the state of the art and contributes additional 
insights to the body of knowledge is needed. In order to generate such a theory, the 
following research question is presented: 
What is understanding as it applies to not only objectively defined problems, but also to 
ill-defined problems? 
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In order to answer the research question, the following questions are addressed: 
• What sub-constructs can be used to create a construct for understanding? 
• How do these sub-constructs relate with one another? 
• How can the process of understanding be bounded to study it independently 
from other cognitive processes? 
This dissertation will provide: 
• A definition of the concept of understanding. 
• A construct that allows studying the concept in a structured manner. 
• An initial theory of understanding based on the construct. 
1.4 RESEARCH APPROACH 
The research approach is focused on building theory out of existing theory. To do so, the 
body of knowledge on the concept of interest is reviewed and common thematic 
threads are obtained. Some of these threads correspond to underlying concepts that 
can be used to establish and define constructs to eliminate ambiguities from the body of 
knowledge. Other underlying concepts correspond to characteristics or conditions of the 
concept of interest. Underlying constructs and characteristics are put together forming 
an axiomatic structure which is a theoretical abstraction of the concept of interest. The 
theoretical abstraction, or meta-construct, is used jointly with proposed definitions to 
build the theory and explain the phenomenon of interest. Succinctly, the theory must 
say what the concept of interest is, what it does, and how it does it. 
The resulting theory should not only be able to explain the existing concept of 
interest in the body of knowledge but also be able to generate new insight. 
Through Modeling and Simulation (M&S) structure and formality are established 
via modeling and computational experimentation. More importantly, simulation 
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provides data that can be analyzed for patterns showing emergence. Emergence is 
sought after given that it allows for theory discovery. 
The resulting theory is also both the result of theoretical insight from the 
modeling process and from the experimental process. In other words, the theory should 
have insight resulting from the abstraction process, insight from the data, or both. The 
only two requirements of the theory are that it explains existing theory, to establish 
plausibility, and that it generates new insights to move the body of knowledge forward. 
Besides the new insight provided, an important contribution of the theory 
should be the level of formality introduced by the M&S process. As Davis, Eisenhardt, 
and Bingham (2007) remark, simulation enhances theoretical precision while providing 
superior insight into complex theoretical relationships among constructs especially 
when empirical limitations exist. Further, they suggest that M&S can provide an 
analytically precise means of specifying assumptions. Figure 2 shows the defined 
approach. 
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Figure 2. Research Approach 
7 
This proposed approach is an enactment of a methodology and method 
proposed by Sousa-Poza, Padilla, and Bozkurt (2008). In terms of methodology, they 
suggest theory creation from existing theories in the body of knowledge and not from 
observations, which makes the approach rationalist. In addition, generalizations from 
identified patterns in the body of knowledge are made instead of generalizations from 
observations. This makes the approach inductive. The generalization from existing 
theories towards theory building makes the underlying methodology rationalist and 
inductive as they name it. In terms of method, obtained premises from theoretical 
generalizations are put together in a system of premises where assumptions are made 
explicit. A structured system of premises is established using modeling. Through 
simulation, an experimental setting is established and new theory is discovered. This 
approach is based on the traceability of the resulting theory to the body of knowledge 
as a form of validation of the theory. If a premise is not found in the literature or drawn 
from it, it is discarded. This allows for the not inclusion of preconceived ideas and/or 
misconceptions about the phenomenon of interest. As mentioned, Sousa-Poza et al. 's 
methodology is grounded on philosophical tenets, reason why it is considered within 
the proposed approach. In terms of method, Sousa-Poza et al.'s method is consistent 
with methods provided in the literature (Mitroff, Betz, Pondy, & Sagasti, 1974; Reiner, 
2007; Davis et al., 2007; Gilbert, 2008) that rely on modeling and simulating a 
phenomenon. However, what the proposed research approach provides is fine-tuning 
these methods by being more specific about steps and results from those steps while 
still being grounded methodologically. Figure 3 shows the Rationalist/Inductive 
Methodology and Method. 
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Figure 3. Rationalist/Inductive Methodology (Adapted from Sousa-Poza et al., 2008) 
1.5 DISSERTATION ORGANIZATION 
The Introduction presented an overview of the dissertation that highlights the problem, 
the approach, and the proposed solution. 
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows. 
Section 2 presents the literature review on understanding which shows that 
there is no agreed definition of understanding beyond the one reflecting the idea of 
grasping something or a description of the concept. The review identifies knowledge, 
worldview, and problem as the main components of understanding, and 
appropriateness, process/output, time, and degrees of understanding as its main 
characteristics. Section 2 also shows the importance of disassociating not only 
understanding from output and process perspectives but also from processes such as 
learning and problem solving. 
Section 3 presents the research approach. The approach relies on 
methodological and methodical underpinnings. At the methodological level, the 
research builds on an axiomatic structure based on premises derived from existing 
theories related to understanding. Methodically, Modeling and Simulation (M&S) is used 
to provide a way to make explicit premises and assumptions in a computable form. The 
model is implemented as an agent-based model and simulated to explore the concept of 
understanding. The results of the simulation are generalized and incorporated into the 
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theory. The theory is used to explain understanding as it is found in the body of 
knowledge and to provide new insights into what understanding is and how it works. 
Section 4 presents a review of the constructs of knowledge, worldview, and 
problem. This review shows that, just as the concept of understanding, these terms are 
loaded with ambiguity as well. The characteristic of appropriateness is explored based 
on the literature of areas such as decision making, system of systems engineering, and 
psychology. 
Section 5 proposes definitions for knowledge, worldview, and problem. These 
definitions serve as the basis to define understanding. Definitions of understanding are 
the starting point towards a general theory of understanding (GTU). From the three 
underlying constructs, the Understanding Construct (UC) is built. This construct is used 
to establish three schools of thought or types of understanding. Two of these types of 
understanding are found in the body of knowledge, while the third is new. 
Section 6 presents implications derived from the GTU. Theoretical and data 
generated implications for the study of understanding and for Engineering Management 
are presented. 
Section 7 presents conclusions and future work. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 UNDERSTANDING UNDERSTANDING: BACKGROUND RESEARCH 
2.1.1 INFORMAL DEFINITIONS OF UNDERSTANDING 
De Regt and Dieks (2005) remark that, many authors claim that scientific explanations 
are the means to achieve understanding, but none of them provide an account of what 
understanding is. Understanding is commonly and informally used in many different 
contexts and rarely due effort is given to properly define the concept. This informality 
has led to different uses of the word, all of them correct but insufficient to build a 
formal definition of the concepts. Some of the many uses of the word understanding 
are: 
• As a verb to highlight a need: to aid students' understanding of scientific 
explanations (Mayer, 1989). 
• As a verb to highlight intelligence: you can probably get a machine to do a 
task requiring intelligence, but if it does not understand the task, then it is 
not really intelligent (Klahr, 1973 p. 300). 
• As a verb to highlight complexity: in addition to the common sense 
characterization of degree of complexity as the number of interrelated parts, 
it also has a somewhat subjective connotation since it is related to the ability 
to understand or cope with the thing under consideration (Klir, 1985). 
• As a noun to highlight the importance of something: designing an 
appropriate set of command arrangements for coalition peace operations 
requires a clear understanding of the essential functions to be performed 
and the qualities desired-the objective criteria for success (Alberts & Hayes, 
1995 p. 83). 
• As a noun and as a verb to highlight a purpose: "if understanding is a primary 
goal of education, an effort to understand understanding would seem to be 
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an obligation, even if one is convinced that is likely to be only a partially 
successful effort" (Nickerson, 1985). 
The previous usages of the word understanding depart from its dictionary 
definition. Dictionary (2009) defines understanding as "grasp the idea of." Webster 
Online (2009) defines understanding as a "mental grasp." These definitions reflect two 
aspects of understanding: the state of having grasped something and the process of 
grasping something. These two perspectives are further explored in the following 
review. 
The areas of study of understanding, epistemology, cognitive science and 
education, and Al are presented as perspectives, namely, theoretical, experimental, and 
computational respectively. 
2.1.2 UNDERSTANDING FROM A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Zagzebski (2001) sees understanding as the grasping of connections among pieces. She 
proposes that "understanding is the state of comprehension of nonpropositional 
structures of reality." This definition suggests that an explanation of what was 
understood can be seen as an output of understanding. This output is then the state 
when one has understood. Zagzebski states that understanding does not require 
knowledge and that falsities contribute more to understanding. Falsity, in her view, 
accounts for knowledge of abstractions. Given that all abstractions are simplifications 
and simplifications of reality are not reality then she does not consider them knowledge. 
This is regardless of how widely accepted those abstractions are. In Zagzebski's case, the 
use of "falsities" to understand a problem implies understanding those falsities. This is 
equivalent to saying that one understands about things when one understands falsities 
about those things. 
Through a linguistic analysis, Franklin (1981) looked at the nature of the word 
understanding from two points: objective and subjective. Objectively, Franklin states 
that understanding, in the comprehensive sense as he notes it, is the "discernment of 
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significant structure of a situation." Franklin adds that too much complexity and the 
structure cannot be grasped and so do not understand; too little and there is insufficient 
structure to be grasped. Subjectively, Franklin refers to wrongly understanding as an 
indication of "something like my lack of complete confidence in my information." 
Whereas the objective perspective refers to the state of understanding as a truthful 
discernment, the subjective perspective seems to refer to the state of understanding as 
an erroneous discernment. It is noted that Franklin does not explain what the 
"comprehension sense of understanding" means. 
One issue raised by Franklin (1981) is the truthfulness, or validity, of 
understanding. Grimm (2008) presents two prevailing cases found in epistemology: the 
one that considers that understanding as a species of knowledge and the one that does 
not. This discussion, although focused on differentiating knowledge from understanding, 
brings the issue whether or not understanding has properties of knowledge; therefore 
whether or not it has a truth component. Zagzebski (2001) makes the case the truth is 
not required. Grimm, on the other hand, states that understanding cannot be had in the 
absence of truth. To this extent, Grimm requires observations of reality to be factive or 
true which is a requirement of knowledge. If this requirement is transferred to 
understanding, it suggests that one understands when something is known in the 
absolute, in other words, one understands problem P when one knows K about P. 
The parallel exploration of the nature of understanding and knowledge and the 
requirement to know K (or falsities) to understand P (or things) is an account of 
understanding knowledge. This is confirmed by Franklin who states that when 
comparing knowledge with understanding, these comparisons "greatly illuminate our 
understanding of knowledge." In other words, when referring to understanding, 
Franklin, Grimm, and Zagzebski are referring to understanding of knowledge. In this 
case, know K to understand P is equivalent to understand K to understand P or 
understanding knowledge to understand a problem. 
De Regt and Dieks (2005) further make this case when presenting that scientific 
understanding of phenomena requires theories to be understood. De Regt and Dieks 
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state two conditions for scientific understanding: criterion for understanding 
phenomenon (CUP) and criterion for the intelligibility of theories (CIT). CUP is stated as: 
A phenomenon P can be understood if a theory T of P exists that is intelligible (and meets 
the usual logical, methodological and empirical requirements). Intelligibility of theories 
is addressed by the CTI that is stated thus: a scientific theory T is intelligible for scientists 
(in context C) if they can recognize qualitatively characteristic consequences of T without 
performing exact calculations. Both criteria rely on understanding a theory T. This can 
be phrased as P can be understood if a theory T of P exists and is understood. 
2.1.3 UNDERSTANDING FROM AN EXPERIMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
Miyake (1986) does not define what understanding is; however, Miyake presents an 
experimental setting to capture understanding. This setting is based on the capability to 
establish what something does and how it does it via a mapping between what is not 
known about something and what is known. The resulting structure of that mapping is 
assessed by a framework called the function-mechanism hierarchy (Miyake, 1986). A 
function refers to the description of the task, the mechanism refers to how the task is 
done, and hierarchy refers to the need to have identified functions and mechanisms to 
explain functions and mechanism at a lower level. Miyake describes the process of 
understanding as the ability to identify functions and hierarchy. Miyake (1986) provides 
the idea of understanding through the point of view. In this case, she highlights that 
when one has difficulty understanding a problem, one needs to shift the point of view to 
solve the problem. This position on the point of view is analytical by nature in the sense 
that it is based on the objective decomposition of the problem in terms of elements and 
function among elements within a structure. 
Nickerson (1985) does not explicitly provide a definition for understanding but 
makes an attempt to a definition. Nickerson states that: 
Understanding is an active process. It requires the connection of facts, the 
relating of newly acquired information to what is already known, the 
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weaving of bits of knowledge into an integrated and cohesive whole. In 
short, it requires not only having knowledge but also doing something 
with it. 
This definition highlights the idea of grasping something in the form of 
connecting something foreign (new information) to something familiar to us 
(knowledge) cohesively. This definition, as Miyake's description, refers to the process of 
understanding but makes no reference to the state of understanding. Nickerson (1985) 
takes experimental data from studies of misconceptions in physics for studying 
understanding. In this case, the setting is made of students who have had formal 
training in physics who do not understand relatively fundamental principles of projectile 
motion. He suggests that not only lack of understanding can be studied through the 
testing and attainment of incorrect answers by students but also that lack of 
understanding is a function of strong preconceptions and misconceptions. 
Perkins (1988) presents that understanding involves knowing how different 
things relate to one another in a web of relations: what the something is for (thing-
function relation), how it works in various ways (function relations) and where it comes 
from (cause-effect relation). The relation concept from Perkins is certainly close to the 
idea of function of Miyake (1986) and of Nickerson's (1985) web-like behavior as the 
capability of understanding of inferring the behavior of a system based on the cause-
effect relationship among its components. Coherence within understanding refers to 
how something is placed within a web of relations as a measure of adequacy and how 
they relate to the world outside an organism (Perkins, 1988). This can be seen as 
equivalent to the concept of cohesiveness presented by Nickerson (1985). However, just 
as Nickerson states, the idea of coherence is still open to interpretation. In 
understanding and standards of coherence, Perkins highlights the dependence of 
understanding on context by providing an example of the importance of standards in 
poetry and physics. Poetry, Perkins remarks, is full of paradoxes, in the sense of 
symbolisms, whereas this practice is not acceptable in physics. Physics requires the rigor 
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of science as standard and leaves little space for interpretation. Poetry, on the other 
hand, has a subjective standard and leaves plenty of room for personal interpretation. In 
understanding and generativity, Perkins presents the case when memory may play a 
deceiving role in understanding; just because one knows does not mean one can apply 
that knowledge. The need of applying knowledge arises and just knowing the web of 
relations may not be sufficient. Finally, in understanding and open-endness, Perkins 
presents the case of the human incapability in knowing all there is to know and all 
possible relations in certain contexts. A web of relations is limited even as the web 
grows and the most that can be said is that some things are understood about it 
adequately for certain purposes. Perkins (1988) provides the idea of a holistic 
perspective or holistic looking as a way to understanding. Perkins remarks that too much 
analysis can be counterproductive when understanding art given that the process of 
appreciating art can be spoiled. However, Perkins does not call for the complete 
elimination of an analytical perspective when understanding art such as the case of 
understanding color relations. 
Miyake (1986), Nickerson (1985), and Perkins (1988) focus on describing 
understanding from a problem perspective. However, they are referring to the 
understanding of knowledge through knowledge application. Further, they rely on a 
solution to assess understanding. If a solution is provided and the problem is solved, 
then the evaluator confirms that the person understood the knowledge applied to the 
problem. Nickerson and Perkins provide the best example. In their examples, a person 
knows physics when knowledge of physics is properly applied to problems of physics. 
2.1.4 UNDERSTANDING FROM A COMPUTATIONAL PERSPECTIVE 
According to Klahr (1974) a machine is intelligent if it shows understanding. Creating 
machines that resemble intelligence, or that show understanding, has been the goal of 
Artificial Intelligence (Al) since its inception. 
Moore and Newell (1974, p. 203) provide a criterion for understanding as: "S 
understands knowledge K if S uses K whenever appropriate." This criterion contains five 
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elements: two old, one paradigmatic, one of subjectivity, and one of opportunity. The 
first old element, presented by Nickerson (1985) and De Regt and Dieks (2005), is the 
use of knowledge or theories; the second old element, represented by the 
appropriateness of the use of knowledge which resembles the standard of coherence 
presented by Perkins (1988); the paradigmatic it refers to understanding a task when 
knowledge has been understood; the one of subjectivity refers to S; and the one of 
opportunity refers to the timely application of knowledge or whenever. 
The use of knowledge, as suggested, is similar to the idea of connecting newly 
acquired information to what is already known of Nickerson (1985) and the existence of 
intelligible theory T of P of De Regt and Dieks (2005). From this it can be said that 
knowledge is needed to be able to understand a task. The idea of appropriateness refers 
to how close the task is to the knowledge used suggesting the possibility of partially 
understanding. The paradigmatic element refers to understanding a task when 
knowledge is understood. This is key to the Al community where one of the main goals 
is knowledge representation towards working on a particular task. Moore and Newell 
(1974) suggest that for a system to understand a process an act of assimilation should 
take place. This act of assimilation is the construction of maps between structured 
knowledge of the system and the structure of the task. This process, they present, is 
what makes the system understand: bringing its relevant knowledge to the task. This 
position suggests that not only does the task need to be structured but also knowledge 
has to be structured as well. 
In Moore and Newell's account when referring to understanding of S, the idea of 
subjectivity of De Regt and Dieks (2005) and Perkins is present. This idea reflects a 
human or computer agent that creates the possibility of different understandings of the 
same task. Finally, the idea of time or opportunity when Moore and Newell (1974) refer 
to "whenever" is of importance. It seems that "whenever" reflects a time lapse when 
understanding is bound to occur which may be a characteristic of the task or a self-
impose condition of the human or computer agent. 
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Oren, Ghassem-Aghaee, and Yilmaz (2007) present a taxonomy of the word 
understanding based on the use of the word in different contexts. However, they do not 
define what understanding is. Instead, they describe the process of understanding 
based on three conditions. They posit that a system A can understand an entity B 
(Entity, Relation, Attribute) if and only if: 
• A can access C, a meta-model of Bs (C is the knowledge of A about Bs); 
• A can analyze and perceive B to generate D (D is a perception of B by A with 
respect to C); 
• A can map relationships between C and D for existing and non-existing 
features in C and/or D to generate result (or product) of understanding 
process. 
These criteria present an account of what understanding is based on the ability 
of a system to understand. It is, however, the same paradigmatic view of Moore and 
Newell (1974) in that it focuses on the formulation of knowledge (C being the meta-
model of B) assuming a structured task. It differs from Moore and Newell's description 
in that the mapping is not one between task and knowledge but between a perception 
of the task and the knowledge base. It can be speculated that this variation is due to 
today's machine's capability of using sensors. This capability was not as prevalent in 
1974 when inputs were inputted directly into a computer. However, if there are 
different systems with the same knowledge, about the same task, Oren et al. suggest 
that all perceptions of the task will be the same and more likely the mapping will be the 
same. This is valid in systems where repeatability and objectivity is desired, but fails 
when different human agents can have different understandings based on the same 
task. 
Oren et al. (2007) provide insight considering understanding as a process. They 
identify steps (sub-processes of the overall process) and elements that are part of that 
process. The basic element mentioned is the knowledge base. The main steps reflect the 
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capability of accessing a knowledge base, analyzing and perceiving of task (amenable to 
analysis) plus the capability of generating, storing, and mapping a perception. Finally, 
Oren et al. (2007) name the output of the process of understanding as result. This result 
is crucial in understanding because it provides an idea of what understanding does. 
However, Oren et al. do not expand on this topic. 
2.1.5 DISCUSSION ON THE THREE PERSPECTIVES 
Franklin (1983), Grimm (2008), and Zagzebski (2001) depart from the definition of 
understanding as 'grasping,' although they focus on describing understanding from a 
knowledge perspective. Furthermore, they seem to be referring to the understanding of 
knowledge to understand a problem. Franklin, for instance, says that a problem is 
understood when the structure of the problem is known. This requires understanding 
one's knowledge about the structure. When one's knowledge is understood, then it can 
be said that the structure is "discerned." Zagzebski's case is equivalent to Franklin's 
considering that one understands about things when one understands falsities about 
those things. It is also Grimm's case where truthfulness of understanding is established 
through the truthfulness of the knowledge used which is equivalent to say one 
understands about things when one knows how things stand in the world. The three 
authors focus on the state of understanding as the moment when an explanation is 
provided or a structure has been discerned. 
Miyake (1986), Nickerson (1985), and Perkins (1988) share the common 
assessment that no major effort has been done towards defining understanding. They 
focus on describing what understanding entitles. Further, they work under certain 
conditions or assumptions: 
• There exists a bounded and structured problem. The structure of a problem 
is identifiable and knowable. 
• There exists an identifiable sequential process to capture that structure. 
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• A solution can be formulated and evaluated through action and via feedback 
assess amount and quality of understanding. 
• Most importantly, they all refer to the understanding of knowledge through 
knowledge application to a problem, in this case, problem solving. 
This list, especially the last bullet, reflects a school of thought. This school of 
thought describes understanding as understanding of knowledge. This paradigm 
explains the need for a bounded problem with an existing solution. This requirement 
allows the evaluator to prove that the person being evaluated knows its knowledge and 
how well it was used. For instance, a person is given a problem in the form of a 
question: 2+2=? If the person answers 4, the problem is solved, and it is concluded that 
the person understood. Yet, what the person understood was the knowledge of addition 
given how it was used to solve the problem. The three authors also focus on the state of 
understanding as the moment when a solution to a problem is provided. 
It is noted that the schools of thought of understanding-of-knowledge-to-
understand-a-problem from the theoretical perspective and understanding-of-
knowledge-through-knowledge-application-to-a-problem from the experimental 
perspective are equivalent in that both reduce to understanding knowledge. In the first 
case, understanding of knowledge is used to reason about a problem. In the latter case, 
understanding of knowledge is used to provide a solution. In both cases, knowledge is 
applied to a problem and when the problem is well-reasoned or solved it is said that the 
person understood. 
Computational researchers, unlike theoretical and experimental ones, focus on 
identifying criteria that capture the process of understanding. In addition, 
computational researchers, like their counterparts, do not define understanding. 
Moore and Newell (1974) and Oren et al, (2007) refer to understanding when 
understanding a task when knowledge is structured. This school of thought relies on the 
idea of an already objectively defined task that displays a structure. It also relies on the 
idea that knowledge can be structured and that a unique mapping, between knowledge 
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and task, is possible. In other words, knowledge is already understood and the task is 
already structured. All that is needed is to map knowledge to a problem. These 
conditions can be achieved under well-defined and bounded cases, but not under ill-
defined ones. 
Referring back to the 2+2 example; whereas the previous school of thought 
wanted to know if the person understood addition, in this school of thought addition is 
already known. Moreover, it is known that 2+2=4. What it is then required is to know if 
the knowledge of addition is properly used in a task or not. 
The three perspectives present one major assumption, ambiguous attempts to 
definitions, and different confounded terms. 
The objectivity assumption is common to all three perspectives. The idea that 
one can objectively establish understanding when a structure of a problem is identified 
(Franklin, 1981; Miyake, 1986) is prevalent. In Miyake's case, for instance, it is assumed 
that a function exists and it is the correct one. Similarly, the definition assumes that 
there is one and only one hierarchy which eliminates other kinds of dependencies 
between functions and parallel structures. Furthermore, the definition assumes an 
equivalency of functions and structures. The objectivity assumption leads to correlate 
difficulty of establishing a structure with complexity. Although there is no denying that 
something inherently more complex may be more difficult to understand, linking 
understanding with a structure is deceiving in the sense that complexity may be present 
in a simple structure. Seemingly simple structures when presenting emergence are more 
complex than non-emergent large structures. The objectivity assumption also leads to 
the assumption that it is possible to validate the outcome of the process of 
understanding. In other words, the process of understanding always yields an 
explanation that can be validated via comparison with an existing solution or through 
solving a problem. However, the testing and attainment of correct answers is 
misleading. This approach, while seeking a way of assessing one's understanding by 
comparing what was understood to a known solution, does not consider the case where 
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there is no solution and does not consider that correct answers may be due to either the 
use of memory or the result of a guess. 
A departure from the objectivity assumption was suggested by Perkins (1988) 
when considering the open-ended, context dependence, and holistic looking of 
understanding. This departure is echoed by Moore and Newell (1974) premise of human 
or computer agent that creates the possibility of different understandings of the same 
task. Both accounts suggest the idea of degree and subjectivity of understanding. 
Subjectivity in this context deviates from the subjectivity characterization provided by 
Franklin (1981) in that it is not about wrong understanding, but about incomplete 
understanding. Incomplete understanding also deviates from the idea of absolute and 
truthful explanation of reality proposed by Grimm (2008) as this account is based on 
knowledge. However, despite the departure from the objectivity assumption, the idea 
of structure still remains. In Perkins' case, the idea is observed when referring to 
relationships among elements of a phenomenon (relations, coherence, and standard of 
coherence characteristics). In Moore and Newell case, the idea is observed when they 
seek to structure knowledge to apply to an already structured task. 
Ambiguity in its use has also made difficult the study of understanding. Franklin 
(1981), Nickerson (1988) and Zagzebski (2001), for instance, provided definitions of 
understanding. However, they do not elaborate on their definitions or use confusing 
terms. Franklin's account refers to discernment as it relates to the "comprehension 
sense to understand." Franklin does not expand on the relation between understanding 
and comprehension, defined comprehension, or even acknowledge that comprehension 
is widely used as a synonym of understanding. Comprehension is also part of Zagzebski's 
account. Like Franklin, there is no definition of comprehension or account on how it 
relates to understanding. Nickerson's attempt to a definition brings ambiguity as well. 
He relies on definitions that are open to interpretation, namely knowledge, information, 
cohesiveness, and the differentiation between newly acquired information and existing 
knowledge. The notion of a cohesive whole is also ambiguous as the definition does not 
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specify how to evaluate cohesiveness and most importantly to whom the whole is 
cohesive. 
Confounding terms limits the study of understanding by not differentiating it 
from concurrent processes. The most common processes are perception, problem 
solving or decision making, and learning. For instance, computational researchers rely 
on perception to understand. Although there is no denying that perception is important 
to capture reality it does not necessarily mean it is part of the understanding process. 
Ergo, when studying understanding in terms of perception, it cannot be differentiated if 
insights are about perception or understanding. Franklin (1981) makes the case of 
confidence on information. Confidence in information is a problem solving issue more 
than an understanding issue (Tallman, Leik, Gray, & Stafford, 1993). Miyake says that 
the process of understanding relies on feedback after action is taken to improve 
understanding. In the literature, feedback due to action is defined as learning (Sterman, 
1994). 
This discussion shows that in the literature there are accepted assumptions and 
preconceptions which have not been challenged. Additionally, an effort to define 
understanding has not been taken. The main assumption is that that understanding is 
objective and follows structure. This assumption implies that there are objective ways to 
objectively evaluate understanding. As mentioned, these assumptions leave out the 
possibility that understanding can be subjective and unable to be assessed due to the ill 
nature of problems being understood. A widely held preconception is that that the 
process of understanding is embedded with other processes. This limits the ability of 
explaining what understanding is given that one could be referring to learning, for 
instance, instead of understanding. To compound the mixing of understanding with 
other processes, there are not accepted definitions of understanding beyond the idea of 
grasping. Mostly, there are descriptions of understanding and when describing it, not 
only descriptions of the concept are ambiguous, but the terms used to describe it are 
also ambiguous. 
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This discussion also presented the existence of two schools of thought of 
understanding: one based on understanding knowledge, the other based on 
understanding a task. Both schools of thought are neither recognized by the disciplines 
that espouse them nor acknowledged by one another. This leads to ambiguity given that 
when talking about understanding it is assumed all people involved are talking about the 
same type of understanding. The schools of thought show that it is not the case. 
2.1.6 UNDERSTANDING'S COMMON THEMATIC THREADS 
From these schools of thought, common thematic threads are identified. These threads 
are reflected in components and characteristics of understanding. The identified 
components of understanding are: 
• Knowledge or that used to understand a problem. 
• Point of View, or worldview, also used to understand a problem, but its role 
needs to be explored and differentiated from that of knowledge. 
• Problem or that what needs to be understood. 
Figure 4 shows the components of knowledge, problem, and worldview and 
implicitly suggests a relation among them. The way these components are related 
should reflect the appropriateness of that relation, how they relate should reflect a 
process, and the result of that relation should reflect what understanding does. 
The identified characteristics of understanding are: 
• Appropriateness which seems to be a condition for understanding that needs 
to be explored. 
• Process and output as the two perspectives that tell us what understanding is 
and what it does. 
• Timing to understand seems to be an issue which needs to be explored. 
• Degree of understanding needs to be explored as well. 
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Figure 4. Components of Understanding 
2.2 PROBLEM SITUATIONS 
Problems where the objectivity assumption does not have certain characteristics, 
among them: 
• There are many participants. 
• No consensus on the definition of the problem. 
• No known solutions. 
• The effects of proposed solutions are intractable. 
These problems are called problem situations. 
When problems are not agreed upon, but still are perceived as problems by 
some, they are called problem situations. Vennix (1996, p. 13) posits the nature of these 
problems as: 
One of the most pervasive characteristics of messy problems is that 
people hold entirely different views on (a) whether there is a problem, and 
if they agree there is, (b) what the problem is. In that sense messy 
problems are quite intangible and as a result various authors have 
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suggested that there are no objective problems, only situations defined as 
problems by people. 
Further, given that problem situations don't have an identifiable and unique 
solution, the process of validating understanding or the evaluation of understanding 
through the evaluation of a solution is not possible. To further make this case; a paradox 
is presented: 
Paradox 1. Understanding a problem does not depend on the existence of a solution 
If we start with the premise that understanding the problem is to have a solution and to 
have a solution is to have understood the problem we reach a tautology that says that 
understanding depends on understanding or that solutions depend on solutions. Second, 
if the tautology is accepted, can the following question be evaluated: can you 
understand that a solution is that there is no solution? 
• // we answer yes to the question, at the very least, understanding must have 
taken place for me to be able to say that no solution was indeed a solution. 
Further, if a solution is the test case for understanding, then there cannot be no 
solution. Given that a solution is demanded for me to show that I understood, no 
solution is not an acceptable solution. 
• If the answer to the question is no, then a solution must exist which excludes me 
from understanding problems that have no solution. In other words, when a 
solution is demanded and no solution is the solution, we are left with no 
possibility to understand given that no solution was discarded as the solution. 
Given that both no solution and solution can be used to understand a problem, 
then having a solution is not part of understanding. 
This paradox shows that understanding does not depend on a solution in the 
general case. A solution is part of understanding, if and only if, it always plays a part in 
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the process. In other words, understanding would not be able to occur without having a 
solution, which is not the case as previously presented. However, understanding can be 
validated through a solution in the particular case where there exists a solution, as 
Miyake (1986) presented it. It is important to note that given that understanding does 
not depend on the validation of understanding, the only way one might assess 
understanding is when there is a claim that one understands. Ergo any action, 
depending on enacting a solution, taken as a consequence of what was claimed to be 
understood must be validated as a separate process. 
Finally, given that the focus of this dissertation is on the individual, the concept 
of problem situations collapses to a case of problem or no problem. However, if for an 
individual there is a problem, it is not an objectively defined problem. In other words, 
even for an individual there is not a unique way of defining the problem. Further, there 
is not a known solution to assess correctness on what was understood. Having said this, 
from this point on referring to problem situations implies the presence of more than 
one individual. Referring to a problem implies the presence of one individual with a 
problem that has characteristics of problem situations. 
2.3 SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW 
This section provides a review of the literature on the concept of understanding. There 
are three main areas of study, or perspectives, of understanding: theoretical, espoused 
by studies in epistemology; experimental, espoused by studies in cognitive science and 
education; and computational, espoused by studies in Al. From these three 
perspectives, two schools of thought of understanding emerge: understanding of 
knowledge through the application of knowledge and understanding of a task through 
structuring knowledge. From these two schools of thought, the use of the term 
"understanding" is ambiguous and it bears many assumptions. The main assumption is 
that a problem can be objectively defined and that there exists a solution to assess what 
was understood. From the two schools of thought common thematic threads are also 
observed. These thematic threads are in the form of components of understanding -
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knowledge, worldview, and problem - and characteristics of understanding -
appropriateness, process/output, time, and degree. Lastly, the concept of problem 
situations was used to establish the general case of understanding. 
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3 DERIVING A CONSTRUCT FOR UNDERSTANDING 
3.1 ON KNOWLEDGE 
Figure 6 shows how the concept of knowledge has been addressed in this review. 
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Figure 6. Review on Knowledge 
Knowledge, as a concept, can be traced back to the ancient Greeks with Plato in 360 BC. 
In his dialogue, Theaetetus (Plato, 1999), he explores the nature of knowledge. Today, 
epistemologists still struggle with a definitive definition of knowledge. 
Plato defined knowledge as justified true belief (JTB). This definition of 
knowledge has two key components: truthfulness and justification (J). Truthfulness 
relies on the idea of an absolute truth on an objective reality. This position requires the 
idea of an objective reality upon which absolute truth can be established. This is not 
necessarily attainable in most real life conditions. Justification is also a matter of debate. 
Franklin (1981) presents that: 
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Apart from the renewed skeptical doubts as to whether and how 
adequate justification could ever be achieved; there are challenges to the 
adequacy of the standard account itself. 
In all, these conditions of truthfulness and justification are not necessarily abided by. 
The difficulty of studying reality forces us to work with models and abstractions of 
reality. These abstractions are not reality ergo any outcome is not truthful in the 
epistemological sense, therefore according to epistemologists' position is not 
knowledge. 
Two more contemporary accounts of the definition of knowledge are found in 
the Knowledge Management (KM) literature. Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995, p. 58) present 
knowledge as the "dynamic human process of justifying personal belief toward the 
'truth'." Nonaka and Takeuchi's definition falls in the category of justifying true beliefs. 
It was shown that this position presents the difficulty of establishing a standard for 
justification. El-Diraby and Wang (2005) present a more pragmatic definition of 
knowledge. They posit that knowledge "consists of facts, truths, and beliefs, 
perspectives and concepts, judgments and expectations, methodologies and know-
how." This basically says that knowledge is everything in our minds. Possibly this is 
because in most cases, an individual may not be able to assess what is knowledge or not 
knowledge. 
Pears (1971) presents two challenges of a definition of knowledge. First, he 
focuses on its recursive nature. Pears (1971, p. 4) posits, "If I know something, I ought to 
know that I know it, and know that I know that I know it? Where will this stop? Second, 
Pears (1974, p. 1) asks a question for which he does not provide an answer. He posits: 
For instance, what is the opposite of knowledge? Is it simply not knowing 
something and not even thinking that one knows it, or is it thinking that 
one knows it when one does not? And, whichever it is, what is not 
knowing? Is it the mental void that a person feels when he has no idea 
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what the answer to a question is? Or is it something more positive than 
this? Perhaps he has an answer, but it may be a false one. Or maybe it is 
true, but only a lucky guess. 
Pears (1971), however, posits an interesting definition for factual knowledge. He 
remarks that factual knowledge is a statement that cannot be a guess. This definition 
does not abide by the conditions of JTB, so the requirements of truthfulness and 
justification are not checked. It just requires knowledge to be stated without guessing. 
This definition seems to be more in line with El-Diraby and Wang (2005) in that it is 
pragmatic in nature. Pears' definition also seems to be in line with that of the artificial 
intelligence (Al) community. From an Al point of view, knowledge is programmed to a 
computer in a form of statements in a rule base (Rusell & Norvig, 2003; Negnevitsky, 
2005). It is noted from figure 12 that the studies of Al and KM are extensively based on 
epistemology. 
Pears (1971) suggests a characterization of knowledge as factual. This 
characterization is also found across bodies of knowledge. In the KM community, as 
presented by Rowley (2000), Nonaka and Takeuchi (1998), and Nonaka, Konno and 
Toyama (2001), knowledge is seen as explicit and tacit. 
Explicit or "codified" knowledge is factual knowledge that can be easily 
expressed with symbols. Symbols can be represented in written words, drawings, 
equations, or pictures and can be conveyed in a systematic way (Nonaka et al., 2001; 
Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995; Allee, 1997). At the very moment something is being 
expressed, it becomes an explicit form of knowledge. Conversely, tacit knowledge is 
more related to sensorial acquired information, individual perception, intuition, and 
personal experience (Nonaka et al., 2001; Ford & Sterman, 1997). It centers on mental 
models an individual carry internally. Those models can be concepts, images, beliefs, 
viewpoints, value sets, or guiding principles that help people define their world (Allee, 
1997). Sternberg, Wagner, Williams, and Horvarth (1995) remark: "it is called tacit 
because it is inferred from actions or statements." 
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The concepts of explicit and tacit knowledge are consistent with declarative and 
procedural knowledge proposed in psychology by Anderson (Anderson, 1995). Anderson 
posits: 
Declarative knowledge is represented in units called chunks and 
procedural knowledge is represented in units called production rules. The 
individual units are created by simple encoding of objects in the 
environment (chunks) or simple encodings of transformations in the 
environment (production rules). 
Anderson's characterization is widely used in Al (Russel & Norvig, 2003). 
Another perspective on the same discussion is one proposed by Ryle (1949). Ryle 
characterizes knowledge as knowing that and knowing how. This characterization is 
consistent with both, declarative/procedural and explicit/tacit knowledge. Knowing that 
relates to the theoretical context of content and facts while knowing how to the 
practical knowledge of actually doing things (Franklin, 1981). 
It can be seen that a universally accepted definition of knowledge does not exist. 
This leads to different uses of the terms under different contexts, which leads to 
ambiguity. The same applies to the characterization, or types, of knowledge. In order to 
use knowledge as a construct in this work, a definition needs to be presented. The same 
applies for the characterization of knowledge. 
3.2 ON WORLDVIEW 
Miyake (1986) and Perkins (1988) made the case of point of view, either analytic or 
holistic, when referring to understanding. Miyake says that an objectively defined 
problem must be seen from a different vantage point if difficulty in understanding arises 
and Perkins mentions holistic understanding as a way to understand art without 
analysis, seeing something aesthetically and not by its individual components. The way a 
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problem is viewed/perceived is due to the lens of the observer. This lens is called 
worldview. 
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Worldview has been defined both as a set of values and beliefs and as a frame of 
reference (F/R). According to Koltko-Rivera (2004): 
Worldviews are sets of beliefs and assumptions that describe reality. A 
given worldview encompasses assumptions about heterogeneous variety 
of topics, including human nature, the meaning and nature of life, and the 
composition of the universe itself. 
Dake (1991) posits that worldviews "entail deeply held beliefs and values 
regarding society, its functioning, and its potential fate". Aerts, Apostel, De Moor, 
Hellemans, Maex, Van Belle, and Van der Veken (1994, p. 9) present world view as "a 
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system of co-ordinates or a frame of reference in which everything presented to us by 
our diverse experiences can be placed." 
From these definitions it can be established that worldview helps individuals 
describe reality, and this description of reality assists them processing their 
surroundings. How reality is described and how individuals learn about it is found in 
philosophy in the form of ontology and epistemology. Keating (2008) presents that 
worldview, or Weltanschauung, is based on philosophical underpinnings, namely 
ontological which is concerned with the nature of reality epistemological which is 
concerned with how knowledge is communicated. 
Keating (2008), by presenting worldview as ontological and epistemological, 
provides a characterization of worldview. This philosophical characterization of 
worldview is consistent with Bozkurt, Padilla, and Sousa-Poza (2007) and Bozkurt (2009). 
The difference with the latter two works is that they add a teleological component and 
the ontological and epistemological spectrums have different ends (Process and 
Substantive instead of Realism and Nominalism and Empiricism and Rationalism instead 
of Positivism and Antipostivism respectively). The teleological component is mentioned 
in Keating (2008) as "the perspective of SoS and drives purposeful decision, action, and 
interpretation," but it is not described as teleological. An epistemological worldview 
would show how an individual seeks knowledge or uses knowledge. Nonaka and 
Takeuchi (1985) suggest that along an epistemological dimension, explicit and tacit 
knowledge sit at the extremes; in other words, an individual relies on its explicit/tacit 
knowledge to describe reality. Keating (2008) posits that an ontological worldview 
shows the individual as part of reality (Nominalism) and external of reality (Realism) 
when describing reality. 
Worldviews have also been studied in psychology, not from the point of view of 
describing reality as Koltko-Rivera (2004), Drake (2001), and Aerts et al. (1994) present, 
but in terms of perceiving reality. Carl Jung's theory of psychological traits (Jung, 1968) 
and its evolution into the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator (MBTI) attempt to capture, 
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among other things, how individuals perceive reality and how they make decisions. The 
focus in this case is on ontology. 
An ontological worldview show how an individual perceives and explains reality. 
Rescher (1996) says that a person can see reality as individual elements (substantive 
reductionist approach) or as a collection of elements (process holistic approach). 
Leonard, Scholl, and Kowalski (1999), under their scale of perception, describe sensing 
and intuition as forms of perceiving reality. Leonard et al.'s (1999) definitions of sensing 
and intuition adhere to Jung's definitions; sensing, "which transmits a physical stimulus 
to perception", and intuition, "which transmits perception in an unconscious way." 
Leonard et al. however, propose their own characterization on perception as field 
dependence/independence. Field dependence "is the ability to separate an object or 
phenomenon from its environment." An individual with field independence prefer detail 
and basic relationships when solving problems, whereas a field dependent individual 
prefers intuitive approaches to solve problems. While field dependent individuals are 
less inclined to separate objects from the environment, field independent individuals 
tend to differentiate objects from environment concepts (Leonard et al., 1999). One 
difficulty with these characterizations is the definition of intuition. Klein (1998) suggests 
that intuition is the recognition of patterns, or lack thereof, in the surrounding 
environment without necessarily identifying the underlying structure that generates 
them. Further, these patterns are identified when the individual is placed in particular 
contexts. In this sense, given that Nominalism and field dependence depend on an 
individual immersed in her/his surroundings, intuition must play a role in her/his 
perception of reality under those conditions. 
Research in systems theory, Soft-Systems Methodology (SSM) and system of 
systems engineering (SoSE), has used the ontological separation of reductionist and 
holistic as posited by Rescher (1996) as a characterization of worldviews. Reductionism, 
related to machine-age systems, involves the independent study of fully observable 
passive parts within a closed system. Holism, on the other hand, involves the 
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simultaneous and interdependent consideration of parts to study a system (Jackson & 
Keys, 1984). 
Just as with knowledge, there is no universally accepted definition of worldview. 
This leads to different uses of the terms under different contexts, which leads to 
ambiguity. The same applies to the characterization, or types, of worldview. In order to 
use worldview as a construct in this work, a definition needs to be presented. The same 
applies for the characterization of worldview. 
3.3 ON PROBLEM 
Sage (1992, p. 54) defines a problem as "an undesirable situation or unresolved matter 
that is significant to some individual or group and that the individual or group is desirous 
of resolving." This account, although simple, is open to ambiguity. This is because there 
is no description on how to qualify something as undesirable or unresolved besides the 
inherent need of someone to resolve it. Vennix (1996) remarks that for problems to be 
considered as such need to be objective and agreed upon. However, in most real life 
settings where group work is required, most problems encountered by engineers and 
managers are not agreeable upon. As mentioned in section 2, when problems are not 
agreed upon but still are perceived as problems by some, they are called problem 
situations. Problem situation is already a characterization of problems within a group 
setting. However, for an individual this concept has ramifications; chief among them is 
that it cannot assume objectivity, on its formulation, and the existence of a known 
solution that can be readily implemented. Figure 8 shows how the concept of problem 
has been addressed in this review. 
Another characterization of problem is that of soft and hard problems. Flood and 
Carson (1993) present that the hard school accepts that problems exist and it can be 
known what the problem is. The soft school, according to Flood and Carson, "accepts 
plurality in human understanding and interests, rejects the hard view, preferring to 
assume situations are problematic rather than to accept that problem exist" (Flood & 
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Carson, 1993, p. 98). The hard and soft differentiation seems consistent with the 
objectively defined problem and with problem situations respectively. 
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Jackson and Keys (1984) use on their context characterization the hard and soft 
differentiation. They posit that some problems are solvable while others are 
manageable depending on the context. Problems within unitary contexts range from 
simple (mechanical-unitary) to complex (system-unitary) and can be solved. Within this 
context, problems are dealt with under the objectively-defined problem premise. 
Problems within pluralist contexts, many perspectives, range from simple (mechanical-
pluralist) to wicked (systemic pluralist). When consensus can be reached, mechanical-
pluralist problems can be solved. Wicked problems, or messy as referred to by Ackoff 
(1974), are not only ill-defined, but also a solution's effect is intractable. Systems 
Engineering, for instance, focuses on solving complex problems when building complex 
systems. However, these problems can be well defined and solved given their technical 
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dominance under unitary contexts (Keating, Padilla, and Adams, 2008). On the other 
hand, soft-systems methodology (SSM) focuses on dealing with wicked problems. 
Rittel and Webber (1973), recognized for coining the term wicked problem, 
identified these type of problems in urban planning. They posit that wicked problems 
"are a class of social system problems which are ill-formulated, where the conflicting 
values, and where the ramifications in the whole system are thoroughly confusing." 
Rittel and Webber also remark: 
As distinguishable from problems in the natural sciences which are 
definable and separable and have solutions that are findable, the 
problems of governmental planning - especially social and policy planning 
- are ill-defined. 
Rittel and Webber (1973) proposed ten properties to distinguish this type of 
problem1. From the ten characteristics, three points of reference can be drawn: 
• The first point refers to formulation of the problem, formulation of the solution, 
and how these two are intertwined. According to Rittel and Webber, the 
formulation of the problem is the problem not only because we have as many 
formulations as people formulating the problem but also because the 
formulation of the problem is in itself a formulation of a solution. The resulting 
formulation cannot be tested and its possible effects cannot be foreseen with 
certainty. 
• Second, the differentiation between solution as an input and solution as an 
output. Rittel and Webber mention the "idea for solving" as well as "inventory of 
all conceivable solutions" which is different than the formulation of a solution. 
The former refer to the input one needs to have in order to deal with a wicked 
problem; in Rittel and Webber's words "an exhaustive inventory of all 
1 Please refer to Rittel and Webber (1973) for the list and an explanation of these characteristics 
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conceivable solutions ahead of time." This inventory is towards the formulation 
of the problem, not as a final "satisfactory" solution to the problem. That 
satisfactory solution is the result or output of the formulation process that uses 
those "conceivable solutions" as inputs. This differentiation is crucial given that 
known solutions may be implemented without having formulated the problem 
first which then becomes a trial and error process. 
• Last, implementation and traceability of a solution cannot be tested or its effects 
foreseen with certainty. This leaves the decision maker with little or no capability 
of learning due to feedback. 
Unlike knowledge and worldview, there seems to be a widely accepted definition 
of problem. This definition suggests that problems are undesirable situations that 
present a need to take them from point A to a desired point B. However, this definition 
of problem is open to ambiguous interpretations given that there is no qualifier of what 
makes a situation as undesirable to an individual. On the characterization of a problem, 
there seems to be different versions of the same case: objectively defined problems 
(hard problem, problem found in the natural sciences, unitary context) and problem 
situations (soft problem, social problem, pluralist context, wicked). Their use is mixed 
which may lead to ambiguity in their use. In order to use problem as a construct in this 
work, a definition needs to be presented. The same applies for the characterization of 
problem. 
3.4 ON APPROPRIATENESS 
Appropriateness, from the review on understanding, is a reflection on how well 
knowledge is used. After reviewing that worldview has an effect on problems, it makes 
sense to suggest that appropriateness is also a reflection on how well worldview is used. 
For instance, in the body of knowledge it is found that intuition, intuitive perception, 
intuitive knowledge, and intuitive decision making, is used to deal with problems within 
particular contexts. Klein (1998) makes this point when firefighters and nurses observe 
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and solve problems by observing cues about patterns or lack thereof. They are able to 
solve these problems, Klein suggests, because they have knowledge about patterns. 
Intuitive knowledge is knowledge about patterns. This knowledge is gained through 
experience. This type of knowledge, within this review, can be seen as tacit, procedural 
or knowing-how. In addition, worldview is not only about perception but also about 
describing or making sense about reality. In this line of thought, an intuitive worldview 
seems to be the more appropriate to make sense of a problem about patterns which 
was perceived intuitively. This identification of patterns is also highlighted by Hubler 
(2005). Hubler mentions that "only if we use a holistic approach, by considering both 
the bottom-up and the top-down pattern formation process, can we understand the 
emerging patterns and dynamics." In this case, holism can also be seen as intuitive 
perception. Further, holism is required to deal with or describe problems that present 
emergence. This is because the problem cannot be described through its parts. 
On the other hand, it has been documented (Jackson & Keys, 1984; Keating et al. 
2008) that problems that are within mechanic-unitary or systemic-unitary contexts can 
be solved by objectively identifying parts and how they relate to one another. Types of 
perception and knowledge that seem adequate for this kind of problem is reduction and 
factual knowledge. A reductionist perception plays a role in the identification of parts, 
while factual knowledge is used to systematically describe the problem. In addition, 
reduction is used to describe and deal with the problem as well. This is consistent with 
Leonard et al.'s (1999) research on field independent individuals. These individuals have 
the inclination to separate objects from the environment and identification of parts. 
This short argument opens a line of discussion about what appropriateness is. In 
the literature of understanding, appropriateness is suggested as a part of the mapping 
between knowledge and problem. However, not only this is open to interpretation, but 
also it does not provide conditions for appropriateness to occur. This argument suggests 
that appropriateness is about the right kind of knowledge and worldview applied to the 
problem. Moreover, the application of the "right type" is the condition for the 
application, of knowledge and worldview, to be considered appropriate. Although 
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appropriateness can be explained in these terms, it needs to be characterized in order 
to be used within a construct of understanding. This characterization is dependent on 
the characterization of knowledge, worldview, and problem. 
3.5 IMPLEMENTING THE RESEARCH APPROACH 
Figure 9 shows how from the two schools of thought found in the literature of 
understanding common thematic threads can be obtained. Some of these threads 
become constructs, namely knowledge, worldview, and problem which are used to build 
a construct of understanding. This construct of understanding will serve as then basis for 
a model that later will be executed with a simulation. The other threads, such as 
appropriateness, are characteristics of the concept should help relate underlying 
constructs. This axiomatic structure should be used jointly with proposed definitions 
providing an explanation of the concept of understanding, which should result in a 
theory. This theory should not only be able to explain existing schools of thought and 
underlying theories, but also should create new insight. M&S will be used throughout, 
and the computational model will be implemented in agents as noted. Data should be 
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Figure 9. Implementing the Research Approach 
3.6 SUMMARY OF DERIVING A CONSTRUCT FOR UNDERSTANDING 
This section elaborated on the identified components of understanding, namely, 
knowledge, worldview, and problem. In addition, the characteristic of appropriateness 
was also explored. It is shown that, in the body of knowledge, current definitions of 
knowledge, worldview, and problem are ambiguous or open to interpretation. Further, 
it is shown that the idea of appropriateness is not explicitly stated, but implicitly used, in 
the body of knowledge. It is suggested that appropriateness is about the right type of 
knowledge and worldview to a particular type of problem. It is suggested that 
definitions for knowledge, worldview, and problem are required to be able to use them 
to define understanding. In addition, types of knowledge, worldview, and problem need 
to be characterized as well as appropriateness. 
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4 TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING (GTU) 
4.1 WORKING DEFINITIONS 
Definition 1. Knowledge 
• Knowledge is a collection of statements that are true or false. 
Definition 2. Problem 
• A problem is a collection of statements for which the truth value is not 
known. 
Definition 3. Worldview 
• Worldview is a collection of statements about statements. 
Unlike definitions found in the body of knowledge about these topics, these 
definitions are precise; they mean one thing and one thing only. This characteristic 
eliminates ambiguity by stating what each construct is without having to describe the 
construct or using undefined terms within the definition. 
The proposed definitions have one common denominator: statements. A 
statement is simply an atomically semantic collection of symbols. This means two 
things: first, symbols by themselves do not carry meaning. Second, a statement does not 
require another statement to have meaning. Examples of statements are: tomorrow is 
going to rain, 2+2=4, Peter likes chips. Although 2 and Peter means number two and the 
name of someone/something respectively, by themselves they do not carry any 
meaning. The use of statements also means that a statement does not require 
ambiguous conditions such as justification or undesirability. The only requirement is 
that it needs be stated. Finally, this common element is of great importance because it 
allows first, the three constructs to be related to one another and second, each 
definition is clearly differentiated from one another. 
In the case of the definition of knowledge, it does not depend how the 
statement was justified, if that statement is true, or if it is just a belief. A person needs 
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to just make a statement that it considers true or false. As it was previously presented, 
the absoluteness and truthfulness of something may not even be assessed even under 
scientific conditions. This is particularly true within problem situations where for 
absolute truth to be established, one needs to know everything about everything, which 
is not possible. Examples of knowledge are: 2+2=4 (True), the author's name of this work 
is Jose (True), and Newton proposed the theory of relativity (False). Notice that 
knowledge is about the truth value assigned to the statement not about the 
truthfulness of the statement. In known cases, truthfulness is easy to establish. 
However, under problem situations it is no longer the case. All that a person can say is 
that a statement is true or false for that person. As an example, if a person says that 
Newton proposed the theory of relativity (True), it is indeed true for him/her. In this 
case, this can be easily refuted given that it is a known fact that Newton did not propose 
the theory of relativity. If a person says that walls deter illegal entry into the country 
(True), it may be true for him/her, but it is not trivially refutable or acceptable with 
known facts. 
In the case of the definition of problem, it does not depend on the undesirability 
of the situation; a person needs to make a statement of what s/he wants to know. 
Further, this definition is consistent with the definition of problem situations; the 
moment a person states that s/he does not know something, then it becomes a problem 
for the person. When statements are compared among people, if they are the same 
they fall under the category of an objectively defined problem. If they are not, then they 
fall under the problem situations category. Examples of problems are: 2+2=4 (True or 
False?), the author's name is Peter (True or False?), and Newton proposed the theory of 
relativity (True or False?). These are statements for which truth value has yet to be 
assigned. It is important to note that, based on definition 1, when truth values are 
assigned problems become knowledge. 
In the case of worldviews, it is not a set of values or a frame of reference. It is 
both. When making a statement about statements a person presents its values and 
beliefs reflecting a frame of reference. Notice that worldviews, as being statements 
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about statements, can be statements about knowledge and statements about problems. 
In other words, individuals have statements about statements for which an individual 
has truth values assigned and about statements for which it does not have truth values 
assigned. An example of a worldview is: because tomorrow is going to rain, Peter would 
rather stay home. This statement shows Peter's preference that when it rains he avoids 
going out. It is a statement (SI) about statements (S2) because SI ; Peter would rather 
stay home, is a statement about S2; tomorrow is going to rain. 
These definitions address the main constructs. In order to address the 
characterization of these constructs, as found in the literature, the following definitions 
are proposed: 
Definition 4. Alpha Statement 
• An alpha statement is a statement about structure. 
Definition 5. Beta Statement 
• A beta statement is a statement about behavior. 
According to Flood and Carson (1993, p.13), structure "defines the way in which 
the elements can be related to each other, providing the supporting framework in which 
processes occur." According to Flood and Carson (1993), behavior is characterized by 
sequential observations on a system at different times. Further, behavior is derived 
from the relation between input and output at different times. Figure 10 shows how 
structure and behavior of a system are observed. 




Figure 10. Glass Box with Observable Structure and Behavior 
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Figure 10 shows a reductionist, linear perspective on structure and behavior. In 
this case, behavior, the relation between input and output, can be explained through 
the structure and the structure can be explained through parts and relations among 
parts. This assumes that a structure is observable and identifiable and that a linear 
correspondence between structure and behavior can be established. In cases where 
behavior is more than the observed parts and relations among parts, the behavior is 
said to be emergent. Now, if instead of a glass box there is a black box, as shown in 
Figure 11, the structure is not, not even its parts, observable. What is observable are the 
input and output which represent the behavior on the inside. Behavior, usually sought 
after, is about patterns (Klein, 1988; Hubler, 2005) or lack thereof (Klein, 1998). 
Input i > ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ | i > Output 
Structure 
Figure 11. Black Box with Observable Behavior 
Using definitions 4 and 5 on definitions 1, 2, and 3: Problem Alpha (Pa) is a 
collection of statements about structure for which truth value is not known. Conversely, 
Problem Beta (P3) is a collection of statements about behavior for which truth value is 
not known. Knowledge Alpha (Ka) is a collection of statements about structure that are 
true or false. Conversely, Knowledge Beta (Kp) is a collection of statements about 
pattern that are true or false. Finally, Worldview Alpha (Wa) is a collection of Alpha 
statements about statements, and Worldview Beta (Wp) is a collection of Beta 
statements about statements. 
This characterization of knowledge, worldview, and problem is consistent within 
definitions 1, 2, and 3. More importantly, it reflects the types of knowledge, worldview, 
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and problem presented in section 4 without the ambiguity. Kaand Kp reflect the explicit 
and tacit characterization of knowledge. Ka and Kp reflect their objective/subjective 
nature; a structure can be learned, taught, and transferred whereas a behavior is 
dependent on the conditions where a person is immersed in. Wa reflects the reality-as-
outside-of-the-individual premise presented by Keating (2008) and field independence 
presented by Leonard et al. (1999) by stating something about an identifiable 
contextless structure. Wp, on the other hand, reflects the individual-within-reality 
premise of Keating and field dependence of Leonard et al. (1999) by being able to 
identify patterns, for instance, which are dependent on context. Finally, Pa reflects 
problems whose behavior is definable by parts and relations among parts. Pp reflects 
problem whose behavior is not definable by parts and relations among parts. They are 
defined by the behavior itself. 
Given definitions 1 to 5, the definitions of understanding stand thus: 
Definition 6. Process of Understanding 
• Understanding is the matching of Knowledge, Worldview and Problem. 
Definition 7. Output of Understanding 
• Understanding is the result of the assignment of a truth value to a problem. 
These definitions present what understanding is, from a process and output 
perspective. This dual perspective was found in the literature as a characteristic of 
understanding. Definitions 6 and 7 fulfill this characteristic in a precise manner. Further, 
definition 7 presents what understanding does; it assigns truth values to problems 
through the matching of knowledge, worldview, and problem. These definitions are a 
big departure from the intuitive idea of grasping found in the literature and present 
understanding as the matching of statements generating statements. Further, the 
nature of the statements being matched is already defined so there is no ambiguity. 
Notice that understanding assigns truth values to problems. By definition, a 
statement with truth values assigned is considered knowledge. Therefore, 
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understanding is a knowledge creation process. This knowledge creation process is 
shown in Figure 12. 
K.W.P ' > ^ ^ ^ ^ ^ | ^ = > P ' ( T o r F ) 
t 
Inside: Matching 
Figure 12. The Black Box of Understanding 
Assuming the black box as the mind of an individual, Knowledge (K), Worldview 
(W), and Problem (W) are inputs to the black box. Inside the box the matching of K, W, 
and P occurs. The visible output of this process is when a person says it understood. This 
occurs when P is assigned a truth value and become ?'. P' is new knowledge. Further, 
when P is assigned a truth value of True, the person understood. When the assigned 
value is False, the person did not understand. This suggests that not understanding is 
still a form of understanding; the person understands that s/he does not understand. 
An explanation, as suggested by Zagzebski (2001), could be considered an output 
of what was understood. However, an explanation cannot be assessed in the general 
case. All that can be assessed is a simple yes or no when an individual is asked whether a 
problem was understood or not. Nevertheless, this explanation is considered an 
important outcome of the understanding process given that an explanation is a 
statement about statements. Consequently, understanding is a worldview creation 
process. This is an important deduction. In the literature there is no description of how 
worldview is created beyond that it is generated by our surroundings. Understanding is 
then identified as the process that creates worldview. 
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It has been defined that understanding is a matching process. This process refers 
to how understanding occurs. However, a definition is insufficient to elaborate on the 
process. To shed insight onto the process, a construct of understanding is proposed. 
4.2 THE UNDERSTANDING CONSTRUCT (UC) 
The understanding construct (UC) is formed by the constructs of knowledge, worldview, 
and problem. Figure 13 shows the construct. 
Figure 13. The Understanding Construct 
Figure 13 shows that knowledge is matched to problem (KP), knowledge is 
matched to worldview (KW), and that worldview is matched to problem (WP). This 
basically says that an individual can apply a solution to a problem, can formulate 
knowledge, and can formulate a problem respectively. By knowledge being possibly 
knowledge of solution, KP is a reflection of a problem solving process. A statement 
about knowledge is a formulation of knowledge. In this case, KW is a reflection of an 
individual framing knowledge. Lastly, a statement about problem is a formulation of 
problem. In this case, WP is a reflection of an individual framing problem. However, KP, 
KW, and WP do not amount to understanding. When W, P, and K are matched to KP, 
KW, and WP respectively, based on definition 6, understanding occurs. This is shown in 
49 
Figure 14a, Figure 14b, and Figure 14c. It is noted that whereas definition 6 and 7 say 
what understanding is, and definition 7 presents what understanding does, these 
matching are accounts of how understanding occurs. 
I Problem I 
Figure 14. Matching of Knowledge, Worldview, and Problem 
4.3 THEORY BUILDING FROM THE CONSTRUCT 
In Figure 14a, the matching of KP and W (KP-W) reflects a person understanding a 
problem through knowledge application. In this case, the person applies its knowledge 
to a problem assuming that this application can be or explained via structure and/or 
behavior through a worldview. This explanation amounts to a formulation of a solution. 
Here, the direct matching of knowledge and problem will allow for understanding of the 
problem. In other words, K is matched with P first assuming that it will match later with 
a preconceived W. This preconceived W is already assumed when K and P are matched 
and confirmed when an explanation is provided. 
In Figure 14b, the matching of KW and P (KW-P) reflects a person understanding 
a problem through knowledge formulation. In this case, the person seeks to formulate, 
via worldview about structure and/or behavior, her/his knowledge. This formulation will 
allow him to understand the problem at hand. Here, the person assumes the 
formulation of the problem is not of importance as long as knowledge is formulated. In 
other words, P is understood when K and W are matched first and then matched to P. 
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Finally, in Figure 14c, the matching of WP and K (WP-K) reflects a person 
understanding a problem through the formulation of the problem. In this case, the 
person seeks to formulate, via worldview about structure and/or behavior, the problem 
at hand. This formulation will allow for understanding the problem at hand. Here, the 
person assumes the formulation of knowledge is not of importance as long as the 
problem is formulated. In other words, P is understood when P is first matched with W 
and then matched to K. 
These three matching reflect three processes of understanding that are the 
reflection of three schools of thought. 
Two understanding schools of thought (ST) were found in the literature: 
understanding of knowledge through knowledge application (ST1) and understanding of 
a task through structuring knowledge (ST2). These schools of thought can be explained 
by KP-W and KW-P respectively. 
ST1 says that an individual can understand a problem or knowledge through the 
use of knowledge. KP-W reflects these equivalent cases. To understand a problem, 
knowledge needs to be understood through knowledge being matched to the problem, 
and a formulation of a solution is presented. This direct matching of knowledge on 
problem is a form of problem solving whose effect of resulting solution is assumed to be 
assessable due to a known structured problem. Conversely, to understand knowledge, 
knowledge needs to be understood through knowledge being matched to a problem 
and an explanation of knowledge is presented. This direct matching of knowledge on 
problem is a form of assessment whose explanation should be assessable given that the 
knowledge being understood is already known and the problem used is already known 
and structured. It is noted that ST1 assumes a uniquely structured problem; ergo, the 
worldview is assumed and assumed to be about structure. KP-W eliminates this 
assumption by considering knowledge and problem about structure and behavior and 
that either, knowledge or problem, can be formulated through structure or through 
behavior. In other words, whereas ST1 considers KQ, Pa, and an embedded Wa, KP-W 
considers Ka, Kp, Pa, Pg, Wa, and Wp. 
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Examples of understanding when considering Ka, Pa, and an embedded W a are 
found in the Systems Engineering and problem solving literature. In these cases, through 
an identifiable structure, objectivity can be established. Moreover, the effectiveness of 
the solution can be assessed given that it was already defined which is then evidence 
that the problem was understood. Examples of understanding when considering Kp, Pp, 
and Wp are found in specialized scenarios such as nursing and firefighting where an 
individual solves problems based on her/his experiential knowledge. Identification of 
patterns is used instead of identification of structure under these circumstances. Given 
that these solutions depend on context, they are considered subjective and rely on the 
assessment of the individual. 
ST2 says that an individual can understand a task through structuring 
knowledge. KW-P reflects this case when knowledge matches to a worldview 
(knowledge is formulated through a worldview) before matching to a problem. In 
addition, it explains ST2 under the assumption that knowledge can be uniquely 
structured. This case is reflected when considering only Ka and Wa for a problem 
assumed to be Pa. KW-P eliminates this assumption by considering Ka, Kp, Wa, Wp, Pa, 
and Pp. 
KW-P, as mentioned before, is found in the artificial intelligence literature which 
is interested in how knowledge is formulated, so it can be used intelligently in particular 
tasks. It is also found during elicitation techniques by answering the question: what do 
you know that is of use to address a problem? 
The understanding construct provides a third school of thought that is not found 
in the literature. WP-K reflects the case when worldview matches to a problem 
(problem is formulated through worldview) before matching to knowledge. WP-K is 
truly the reflection of a problem situation given that even for the same person, the 
formulation of the problem is subject to change. This change in formulation has an 
effect on ST1 and St2 given that it changes their understanding based on the assumption 
of a unique formulation. Further, when considering that the problem can be formulated 
under Wa and Wp and then matched to Ka or Kp the formulation space is even larger. 
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WP-K is found within the systems thinking and system of systems literature. 
These bodies of knowledge posit that a unique formulation of socio-technical problems 
is not possible. Each individual formulation becomes a unique formulation of the world 
that later must be reconciled. In this case, what was understood is a unique 
understanding, for a person at a certain point in time. 
The understanding construct also provides information about three 
characteristics mentioned in the literature review: time, appropriateness, degree of 
understanding. 
Time is a condition inherent to the problem or self-imposed by the individual. If 
time is inherent to the problem and individual may have to meet deadlines. On the 
other hand, when time is self-imposed by the individual, s/he responds to her/his own 
deadlines. From these perspectives, time to understand is considered within a window 
of opportunity (WO), inherent to the problem or self-imposed by the individual, where 
the time is allotted to understand the problem. However, providing an answer within a 
WO requires having an idea of how to measure understanding. This measurement is 
provided by appropriateness. 
Appropriateness is better expressed by the following propositions: 
• Proposition 1. Understanding occurs when: 
Kj, Wj, and Pk match 
• Fori=j = k. 
• Proposition 2. Not-Understanding occurs when: 
• Kj, Wj, and Pk match 
• Fori=!jori=!korj=!k. 
Appropriateness is a condition achieved when knowledge, worldview, and 
problem of the same type are matched. When an appropriate match occurs, a person 
understood. A percentage of appropriately matched statements out of the total 
considered problems, provide a measurement for understanding at a point in time. 
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Conversely, when statements do not match it also provides a metric. Not-understanding 
refers to the fact that a person does not understand. This metric can be seen as a 
counter that updates every time a person says it does not understand. This counter 
stops when the person assigns to the last problem statement a truth value of true. 
Succinctly, the result of this counter, effort to understand, is just the sum of all newly 
assigned statements with the value of false. Effort to understand plays a crucial role in 
this work, given that from the next section on is the metric used to assess difficulty on 
understanding a problem. 
In terms of effort, other possible metrics provide a way of assessing what was 
understood. Three possible metrics for understanding are completeness, truthfulness, 
and misunderstanding. 
Completeness is the number of statements with assigned truth values out of the 
ones that needed assignment. It answers the question: of all defined statements 
without truth value, how many of those have an assignation? Truthfulness is the 
number of statements with correctly assigned truth values out of the ones that needed 
assignment. It answers the question: of all defined statements without truth value, how 
many of those truth values were correctly assigned? Finally, misunderstanding is the 
number of statements with wrongly assigned truth values out of the ones that needed 
assignment. Three notes are made on these metrics: first, they are not independent. 
They could be affecting each other. For instance, the completeness metric contains 
measurements of truthfulness and misunderstanding. Second, these metrics can be 
measured under fairly simple conditions. And third, these metrics help differentiate 
concepts from one another. For instance, misunderstanding can now be differentiated 
from lack of understanding; whereas the former relates to wrongly assigned truth 
values, the latter relates to not-understanding. 
Another important characterization is that of being able to understand. Being 
able to understand is not the same as not-understanding. This differentiation can be 
established, at the very least, with the following three conditions: existence, capacity, 
appropriateness, and relevance. 
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1. Existence: P must exist for it to be understood. 
2. Capacity: K and W must exist for P to be understood. 
3. Appropriateness: K, W, and P need be of same type when matched. 
4. Relevance: K and W are applicable to P. 
Being unable to understand means that conditions (1) and (2) are not satisfied. 
Conversely, not-understanding does not satisfy condition (3). Condition (4) is a 
safeguard for condition (3) in that, at the very least, K and W are relevant to P. 
4.4 BUILDING A MODEL AND A SIMULATION 
The UC and corresponding definitions serve as a formal characterization of the GTU. To 
establish that this formalism is not only consistent but also able to further generate 
theory, a computable model and corresponding simulation need to be created. The 
computable model enhances the formality of the GTU while the simulation generates 
data that can be analyzed for further knowledge creation. 
4.4.1 SELECTION OF THE M&S PARADIGM 
The selection of the appropriate M&S paradigm to the problem at hand is paramount. 
The proposed research approach assumes that this selection was already made. 
However, this work requires that the selection be made explicitly in order to establish 
the required academic rigor. 
A model is a representation of a system, entity, phenomenon, or process (Davis 
& Anderson, 2003). According to Zeigler et al. in Diallo, Tolk, and Weisel (2007), a model 
is a system specification, such as a set of instructions, rules, equations, or constraints for 
generating input/output behavior. A simulation is the execution of a model to replicate 
its behavior (Zeigler in Diallo et al. 2007). Davis and Anderson (2003) define simulation 
as the act of using a simulation engine to execute a dynamic model in order to study its 
representation of the model's behavior over time. Davis et al. (2007) define it as a 
method that involves creating a computational representation of the underlying 
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theoretical logic that links constructs together within a world. These representations are 
then coded into software that is run repeatedly under varying experimental conditions 
in order to obtain results. This position is consistent with Gilbert and Troitzsch (2005) 
who present simulation as used as a method of theory development given that we can 
express theories as procedures in the form of a computer program, which is more 
precise than the textual form of the procedure, which is helpful in refining the theory. 
Dealing with complex phenomena M&S becomes extremely useful given that it 
allows the researcher to explore possibilities and test the boundaries of theories in 
development. According to Davis et al. (2007) simulation has become highly significant 
as a methodology because not only can it provide superior insight into complex 
theoretical relationships among constructs especially when empirical limitations exist 
but also because it can provide an analytically precise means of specifying assumptions. 
Gilbert (2000) says that simulation is particularly useful when dealing with non-linear 
relations that are pervasive in the social world, relations that get too complicated to be 
analytically tractable through mathematical or statistical equations. 
This insight into complex theoretical constructs is even more important given 
that, because of the nature of complexity, we may not even be able to establish causal 
relationships between action and response, between input and output. This implies that 
any multiple of perspectives can be equally valid in describing the phenomenon due to 
multiplicity of outcomes. Each one of these perspectives is necessary and all need to be 
considered. However, empirically this cannot be done. This is where simulation comes 
into place; as placing reality as a subset of the perspective, perspectives that now 
become possible alternatives. This characteristic is of crucial importance in this research 
given the multiple possible perspectives within a problem situation. 
Hester and Tolk (2010) posit that the categorization of M&S methods depends 
on "simulation challenges, which means they are predominantly residing on the 
implementation level." They propose a model spectrum for engineering that ranges 
from high abstraction models to high resolution models. The former are less detailed 
and focused on a big picture. In this spectrum they place the most used M&S paradigms: 
56 
System Dynamics (SD), Discrete Event Simulation (DE), and Agent-Based Simulation 
























Figure 15. M&S Spectrum for Engineering (Adapted from Hester & Tolk, 2010) 
According to Gilbert and Troitzsch (2005), systems dynamics is "described using a 
system of equations which derive the future state of the target system from its actual 
state." According to Hester and Tolk (2010), SD models are composed of differential 
equations describing a system. They are unable to handle stochastic parameters and 
cannot operate in a parallel environment. 
Discrete event simulation is a modeling approach based on the concept of 
entities, resources, and block charts describing entity flow and resource sharing. Entities 
are passive objects that represent people, parts, messages, etc.; they travel through the 
blocks of the flowchart where they stay in queues, are delayed, processed, split, etc. 
(Borshchev & Filippov, 2004). According to Hester and Tolk (2010), DE can model 
stochastic systems and can be executed in parallel to reduce computing time. 
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Agent-based modeling is a "computational method that enables a researcher to 
create, analyze, and experiment with models composed of agents that interact within 
an environment" (Gilbert 2008, p. 2). According to Hester and Tolk (2010): 
Agents can be programmed to work in a cooperative or competitive 
manner towards other agents. In particular the characteristics of 
autonomy and flexibility make them of interest to engineers, as they 
enable to add human-like behaviors to simulation. 
To select the most appropriate modeling paradigm, Hester and Tolk (2010) 
suggest selecting the lowest resolution possible to model a real world scenario. They 
remark that this is difficult given the trade-off as simulation complexity increases with 
increased model resolution. 
This work presents modeling challenges, chief among them are: 
• There is no equation that describes relation among constructs or a dominant 
structure to be modeled. 
• There is no sequence of events. 
• Constructs and premises can be established. 
If there are no underlying equations that establish flow rate among objects and 
underlying structure that shows causality within this work, then systems dynamics is 
discarded as a candidate for modeling the phenomenon in question. Given that no 
sequence of events describing entity flow can be established, discrete event simulation 
is discarded as well. Now, if constructs are seen as agents and premises as underlying 
rules that explain the behavior of interaction among objects, agent-based modeling 
becomes the most appropriate paradigm for this work. Hester and Tolk (2010) remark 
that only ABM can handle dynamic, stochastic, parallel, and continuous problems. This is 
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appropriate in this work given that no preconceived behavior must be built into the 
simulation. 
4.4.2 AGENT-BASED MODELING 
According to Gilbert (2008, p. 2): "agent-based modeling is a computational method 
that enables a researcher to create, analyze, and experiment with models composed of 
agents that interact within an environment." When talking about ABM, the concept of 
agents needs addressing. However, the definition of an agent is a contended one in the 
simulation community (Tolk & Uhrmacher, 2009). 
According to Gilbert and Troitzsch (2005, p. 172) "although there is no generally 
agreed definition of what an 'agent' is, the term is usually used to describe self-
contained programs that can control their own actions based on their perceptions of 
their operating environment." Rusell and Norvig, (2003, p. 32) define an agent as 
"anything that can be viewed as perceiving its environment through sensors and acting 
upon that environment through actuators." Rusell and Norvig present the term precept 
to "refer to the agent's perceptual inputs in a given instant" and the term percept 
sequence as "the complete history of everything the agent has perceived." Figure 16 
reflects the agent concept as presented by Rusell and Norvig. 
Figure 16. A Basic Agent Structure (Adapted from Russel & Norvig, 2003, p. 33) 
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Tolk and Uhrmacher (2009) propose that an agent should perceive its 
environment, and act in its environment. Further, an agent should communicate with 
other agents to establish a social ability. Moreover, an agent should be autonomous, 
outside of central control, and flexible, being able to react to, pursue goals, or adapt to 
changes in its environment. 
Moya and Tolk, in Tolk and Uhrmacher (2009), state that there are three external 
and four internal architectural domains. External domains "comprise those functions 
needed within an agent to interact with his environment" (p.97). These external 
domains are: perception domain, which observes the environment through sensors and 
sends information to internal sense making domain; action domain, which comprises 
effectors to act on its environment; communication domain, which exchanges 
information with other agents or humans. Internal domains "categorize the functions 
needed for the agent to act and adapt as an autonomous object" (p. 98). These internal 
domains are: sense making domains, which receive input and map this information to 
the internal representation. The decision making domain supports methods that are 
reactive and deliberative. These methods lead to action. Adaptation domain updates 
current goals, tasks, and desires. Finally, the memory domain stores all information 
needed for an agent to perform its tasks. Figure 17 presents this architectural frame. 
Figure 17. Agent Architectural Frame (Adapted from Tolk & Uhrmacher, 2009) 
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As a modeling paradigm, agent-based modeling has become very popular 
recently in the social sciences for its appeal for building models where individual entities 
and their interactions are directly represented (Gilbert 2008). Axelrod (1997, p. 3-4) calls 
agent-based modeling the third way of doing science: 
Like deduction, it starts with a set of explicit assumptions. But unlike 
deduction, it does not prove theorems. Instead, an agent based model 
generates simulated data that can be analyzed inductively. Unlike typical 
induction, however, the simulated data come from a rigorously specified 
set of rules rather than direct measurement of the real world. 
Abrahamson and Wilensky (2005) present three main contributions of ABM to 
the advancement of theory: 
• Explicitizing: The ABM environment demands an exacting level of clarity and 
specificity. 
• Emergence: ABM enables the researcher to mobilize an otherwise static list 
of conjectured behaviors and witness any group-level patterns. 
• Intra/interdisciplinary collaboration: ABM serves as lingua franca enabling 
researchers who otherwise use different framework terminology and 
methodology to understand and critique each others work. 
Explicitizing is crucial in any research in a manner that demands to declare 
assumptions and presuppositions about the model and especially about the system or 
theory being modeled. In addition, it provides a high level of formalization and precision 
that would not be achieved if the theory is expressed in natural language (Gilbert, 2008). 
Emergence occurs when interaction among objects at one level gives rise to different 
types of objects at another level. Emergence is one of the most important ideas from 
complexity theory (Gilbert & Troitzsch, 2005). This interaction among objects is 
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translated to interaction among agents making emergence a characteristic widely 
associated with this modeling paradigm. Finally, intra/interdisciplinary collaboration 
allows for researchers across disciplines, political science, biology, and engineering, to 
collaborate by constructing models together that can use each one of their theoretical 
strengths from their own fields. 
Jennings (1999) suggests two drawbacks of ABM: 
• The patterns and the outcomes of the interaction are inherently 
unpredictable. 
• Predicting the behavior of the overall system based on its constituent 
components is extremely difficult (sometimes impossible) because of the 
strong possibility of emergent behavior. 
Referring to bullet one, Axtell (2000) remarks that robustness of results can be 
assessed with a sufficient number of runs and systematically varying initial conditions. 
Referring to bullet two, emergence is also advantageous. This is because we can see the 
overall behavior of the system as it is more than the sum of its parts. 
4.4.3 MODEL ANALYSIS 
Simulation is used in this work because it is suited for developing theories. Davis et al., 
2007 remark that simulation enhances theoretical precision and enables theory 
elaboration and exploration. Oren (2009, p. 15) takes this idea further and states that 
"simulation can be perceived as a computational activity, systemic activity, model-based 
activity, knowledge generation activity, and knowledge processing activity." 
As a computational activity, Oren remarks that "the role of the computer in 
simulation spans from generation of model behavior to simulation-based problem 
solving environments." (p. 15) He suggests that this perspective is likely to hinder high-
level possibilities of simulation-based computer-aided problem solving environments 
such as experimental frame specification. As a systemic activity, Oren presents M&S as a 
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way of representing a system in terms of inputs, states, and outputs. He remarks that 
this perspective presents the difficulty of "finding the state variables which may satisfy 
the input-output pairs." (p. 15) As a model-based activity, Oren presents M&S as a form 
to study different activities such as model composability, model-based management, 
parameter-based management, and symbolic modeling. As a knowledge generation 
activity, Oren states that "from an epistemological point of view, simulation is a 
knowledge generation activity." (p. 15) He remarks that the generated knowledge is 
model-based experiential knowledge. Finally, in seeing M&S as a knowledge processing 
activity, Oren remarks that it allows for integrating simulation with other knowledge 
processing techniques. The perspective of M&S as a knowledge generation activity is the 
one used in this work. 
Given that all the elements of a conceptual model are in place (components of 
understanding, process that relates components, and conditions of understanding) a 
simulation seems to be the next logical step. In order to do so, the understanding 
construct is converted into a computable model representation. This model is 
implemented using agents and simulated in order to collect data. Data provide insight 
into the process of understanding through generalizations. 
The Systems Engineering Process (SEP) is used to analyze, design, and implement 
the model. Figure 18 shows the SEP and all its steps. (DAU, 2001, p. 31-33) presents this 
process starting with the process input which reflects objectives, requirements and 
major constraints. Requirement Analysis is used to develop functional and performance 
requirements: what the system must do and how well. Using Functional Analysis is the 
decomposition of requirements into lower level functions resulting in a functional 
description of the product. Synthesis builds up on the analysis in terms of the 
implementation. These three stages are assisted by the requirement loop allowing for 
the traceability of the function to the initial requirement, the design loop allowing for 
the traceability of the elements to be implemented to the function, and the verification 
loop allowing for the traceability of the implementation to the original requirement. 
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Systems Analysis and Control is an overseeing activity of all the steps of the process. The 
process output reflects any data or processes needed to develop the product. 
Figure 18. The Systems Engineering Process (Adapted from DAU, 2001) 
The reporting of the SEP traditionally is a collection of documents that contain a 
list of requirements or measures of performance, for instance. However, modeling 
alternatives such as block diagrams or UML (Unified Modeling Language) are widely 
used in systems engineering (Ogren, 1999). UML, for instance, provides the advantage 
of covering all modeling phases while being reusable and graphical in nature (Bahill & 
Daniels, 2002). The International Council on Systems Engineering (INCOSE) highlights the 
use of Systems Modeling Language (SySML) to model complex systems to provide 
"standards representations with well defined semantics that can support model and 
data interchange." (INCOSE, 2007, p. 7.7) 
UML is used in this dissertation to guide the modeling effort. UML highlights 
what needs to be done and how it needs to be done. Some of the most used diagrams 
are use case, class, state machine, activity, and sequence. Use case diagrams in UML 
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capture elements and main processes in a model while defining requirements. Class 
diagrams capture the static structure of a system by showing how different elements 
relate to one another. State machine diagrams capture the overall behavior of a system 
at any point in time and activity diagrams capture activities within states. Finally, 
sequence diagrams show interaction in elements in a sequence. These diagrams are 
presented in two batches: one batch presents a paradigm-independent analysis and 
design of the problem; the other presents an implementation-oriented design of the 
solution of the problem. The diagrams presented are simple diagrams, given that this is 
a simple model. However, the model is complete enough to convey a system that 
reflects the process of understanding. 
What 
The high level requirement of this model is to help address the research goal: to provide 
an experimental setting that not only reflects the process of understanding, but allows 
for analysis of results to gain insight into what was understood. In order to do so, 
constructs and relations among those constructs need to be formulated. From the 
discussion from the previous section, three constructs need to be considered: 
knowledge, worldview, and problem. Figure 19 shows these constructs in a use case 
diagram. At the heart of this model lie the rules that allow for these constructs to relate 
to one another which are the matching of knowledge (K), worldview (W), and problem 
(P) and the fulfillment of the condition of appropriateness. These rules are based on 
definition 6 and propositions 1 and 2 that when put together form a system of premises. 
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Knowledge 
Model of Undei slam£ng 
Figure 19. Constructs of the Model of Understanding 
In order to further discuss these constructs and the relations in which they are 
involved, characterizations of those constructs are needed. Figure 20 provides a class 
diagram with the characterization of K, W and P derived from definitions 4 and 5. 
Individual 
Knowledge 
K-AITa K-Beta W-Alfa W-Beta P-Alfa P-Beta 
Figure 20. Class Diagram of the Model of Understanding 
Figure 20 shows the breakdown of an individual in constructs needed for 
understanding. The individual has a knowledge base, with a collection of Ka and K(J; 
worldview, with a collection of Wcx and W|3, and what it considers its problem, with a 
collection of Pa and P(3. 
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How 
Behavioral diagrams show how the system works. Figure 21 shows the state machine 
diagram for an individual. This diagram shows the states an individual goes through 
when understanding a problem, namely, selection of K, W, and P; matching of K, W, and 
P; and assessment of effort. Given that the model focuses on establishing a baseline, 
there is no suggestion regarding the selection process in order to avoid introducing a 
particular strategy. Instead, that selection is to be implemented as random. The 
matching occurs under the three schools of thoughts, KW- P, KP- W, and WP- K. Finally, 
the assessment of effort is reflected with the update to a counter every time the 










Figure 21. State Diagram for the Model of Understanding 
A more elaborate form of adding more information is an activity diagram. Figure 
22 is an activity diagram that represents how an individual selects from the knowledge 
base, from its worldviews and from the already identified problem. To make the 
assessment of effort, a counter is set up to account for mismatching of K, W, and P 
counting until the last P is understood. When understanding occurs the problem 
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statement that was understood is no longer considered. Just as the state diagram, one 
activity diagram is considered for the three schools of thought of understanding given 
that it presents the same process of selection, matching, and assessment what differs is 




Randomly select K Type, P Type and Wtype 
> 
[Start Counter J 
[ Match K,T, and P attime=t 1 
j, 
Y Types match v J 
Types do not match 
There is at least a P remaining 
/ P is not understood J $4llpdate Counter ]—5J Check Pi 1 > A . -*® 
No P remaining 
Figure 22. Activity Diagram for the Model of Understanding 
Implementing UML with NetLogo 
Figure 23 shows an agent-based class diagram. The class diagram is the only of the 
previous diagrams that convey more information under this implementation. Use case, 
for instance, under an agent notation remains the same. 
NetLogo is a multi-agent modeling language developed by Uri Wilensky at the 
Center for Connected Learning and Computer-Based Modeling of the Northwestern 
University of Evanston (US). It is conceived with the purpose of implementing simple 
rules into to agents and observe emergent phenomena. According to Albiero, Fitzek, 
and Katz (2007, p. 579) 
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NetLogo is particularly convenient for the analysis of any complex system 
developing over time, as the programmer can give instructions to 
thousands of independent agents all operating concurrently. 
For this research, agents can be either turtles (name of moving agents within the 
NetLogo environment) or patches (not moving agents). Patches are the minimal unit of 





































Figure 23. Agent-based Class Diagram for the Model of Understanding 
Figure 23 shows the agent entity and some of its attributes and methods. These 
attributes and methods are passed onto turtles representing knowledge, worldview, 
and problem. In the implementation, a patch is also an agent that shares some of the 
attributes and method with turtles. To avoid giving turtles strategies, main processes, 
such as counting and matching of turtles are given to patches. When turtles arrive to a 
patch some of these processes are triggered. In the case where the three types arrive to 
a patch the matching of K, W and P takes place. In other words, the rules of interaction 
among agents were given to the patch where they stand. This is an implementation 
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decision. The agents are reactive agents whose action is totally random. The matching, 
which is at the heart of the rules of interaction depends on the school of thought under 
consideration. Those rules of interaction are shown in Figure 24 with a sequence 
diagram. 
Knowledge 




































































I 13: KW lock 
t11 5: row 
Figure 24. Sequence Diagram for the Model of Understanding 
A sequence diagram has shortcomings when used to show interaction among 
agents given that agents run in parallel instead of a sequence. Additionally, there is no 
difference in which agent arrives to the patch first. For instance, during KP-W a 
knowledge agent can arrive first and worldview agent second or vice versa to a patch. 
However, this diagram reflects the three schools of thought or types of understanding 
established by the theory as it shows their implemented sequence. 
For instance, the KP-W matching is implemented through the simultaneous 
overlapping of K, W, and P agents. The match, however, starts with the first two agents 
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to arrive. In KP-W, if K and P arrive first, then they are locked waiting for a W turtle to 
arrive. For WP-K, if W and P turtles arrive first then they are locked waiting for a K turtle 
to arrive. Finally in KW- P, if K and W turtles arrive first at a patch then they are locked 
waiting for a P turtle to arrive. The locking time is the window of opportunity (WO) 
mentioned in section 5. WO affects only KP-W and WP-K which are the ones where the 
initial match, KP and WP respectively, contains a problem. If within this window of 
opportunity for KP and WP, W and K turtles, respectively, do not arrive then the agents 
separate. For the KW match, the wait is for a P turtle so the match is not affected by the 
window of opportunity. They do separate however, when a P turtle arrives and the 
matching occurs. This is to avoid the effect of memory in the matching and allowing K 
and W agents to move freely. 
It is important to mention that this is an implementation and may not be the 
implementation. What this implementation provides, however, is the advantage that it 
is looking for a baseline, meaning looking for what understanding is, and not to reflect 
strategies on how understanding can be performed better. For that purpose, strategies 
such as memory, or preconceived strategies by the researcher are left out. 
Finally, as the loops in Figure 24 suggest, the SEP is not linear. Iterative steps 
take place in between the SEP. In addition, the first step in the verification of the model 
has taken place by tracing the constructs and rules to be implemented in the model 
back to the theory from where they were generated via intermediate definitions and 
propositions. Finally, this computer model allows for the experimental setting presented 
by the high level requirements. The results are obtained after the simulation is 
executed. 
4.4.4 MODEL IMPLEMENTATION 
Up to this point, the overall modeling process has progressed from what the system 
needs to do and how to what and how it needs to be formulated using an UML agent-
oriented notation. From this point on, these subsections are more focused on the 
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computer simulation of the model. This is still considered part of the design process, but 
it was separated for presentation purposes. 
Throughout the modeling process, what it has been shown are turtles with 
attributes and methods, interacting in a matching process under three scenarios. 
The interaction within the simulation, is derived from definitions 4 and 5 and 
propositions 1 and 2. In other words, when corresponding types of statements, alpha or 
beta, match understanding occurs. When mismatch between types occur then counter 
adds 1 towards effort to understand. 
Propositional Logic of the Agent Simulation 
• Let's define: 
• At = Ka in patch 
' A2 = Ke in patch 
• Bi = Wa in patch 
• B2 = We in patch 
• Ct = Pa in patch 
• C2 = Pe in patch 
• In order to have a match, K, W and P agents must be on the same patch. Only 
three agents are accepted per patch at the time. 
Understanding occurs and P, is eliminated when: 
• Ai A Bi A Ci 
• For i = lor 2 
• Not-Understanding occurs when: 
• Ai AS/ AC/' 
• Fori = 1 and 2 
• Unable to Understand or not-Understand when: 
• - (A, A Bi Ad)V (A, A-(Bi ACi))V (Bi A - ( A, AcjV (d A H A, A Bi) 
) V hAi A(BiAQ)\/ hBi A(AiAQ)\/ hd A(AiA Bi)) 
• Fori = 1 and 2 
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Understanding and not-understanding are both considered within the 
simulation. The former allows P turtles to be eliminated while the latter allows 
accounting for effort to understand. 
Structure and Behavior of Agents 
The agents modeled in this work are simple agents with no additional learning or 
decision making capability. This is because the objective is to establish a baseline with 
no strategy or the possibility of creating a pattern of behavior. Rusell and Norvig (2003, 
p. 46) defined these agents as simple reflex agents. These are agents that "select actions 
on the basis of the current precept, ignoring the rest of the precept history." They also 
state that "simple reflex agents have the admirable property of being simple, but they 
turn out to be of very limited intelligence" (p. 47). The structure of this type of agent is 
presented in Figure 25. 
Figure 25. Diagram of a simple agent (Adapted from Russel & Norvig, 2003, p. 47) 
In other words, the agent bases any decision taken on its actual state without 
considering any past state. Russel and Norvig (2003) state that these agents only work if 
73 
the environment is fully observable2. However, this is not the case here given that the 
environment is not fully observable by an agent. To overcome this hurdle, According to 
Russel and Norvig, the next action can be determined by randomizing the actions an 
agent can take. This random behavior, they posit, can be rational in some multiagent 
environments whereas for single-agent environments, a more sophisticated agent is 
better. 
Given that the model is conceived to be run as a multi-agent simulation looking 
for a baseline, a simple reflex agent with fully random actions is considered the most 
appropriate. In the case that a rule set of behavior describing understanding existed 
already or that one wants to evaluate how to better understand (having already defined 
what understanding is) the use of a goal-based or utility-based agent need to be 
considered. This, however, is outside of the scope of this research. 
Rusell and Norvig (2003, p. 43) state that the hardest case of the environment 
and agent can be placed in is where it is partially observable, stochastic, sequential, 
dynamic, continuous and multi-agent3. This agent-based model has been conceived is 
partially observable, stochastic (next step of the environment is not completely 
determined by the current state), episodic (next episode does not depend on previous 
actions), dynamic (environment changes while agent is deliberating), discrete (finite 
number of distinct states and discrete set of percepts and actions), and multi-agent 
(considering K, W, and P as distinct types of agents). 
In summary, to establish a baseline for understanding: 
• No predisposed idea is built in the model. Everything is based on 
premises derived from existing theory. 
• All forms of movement and interactions are random. 
• In addition: 
2 A task environment is effectively fully observable if the sensors detect all aspects that are relevant to the 
choice of action; relevance, in turn depends on the performance measure (Rusell & Norvig, 2003, p. 41). 
They state that little unobservability can cause serious trouble when using this kind of agent given that 
they would run into infinite loops. Reason why, randomizing their next step is needed. 
3 For a full description on these task environments, please refer to Russel and Norvig, (2003, p. 40-43) 
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o No memory 
o No sequencing 
• No mathematical function that relates constructs. 
• The output is truly emergent based on simple rules of interaction among 
simple agents. 
A Computer Implementation 
The interface presented in Figure 26 was created in Netlogo 4.1 containing a way of 
establishing initial conditions for the simulation, in terms of knowledge, worldviews, 
problem, window of opportunity, and school of thought. In terms of output and for 
verification purposes, what was understood, what was not understood and problems 
remaining are presented. Window of opportunity (WO), as it was initially highlighted, 
was created to consider the effect of time within the construct of understanding. Agent-
Type is a switch used for verification purposes. It shows the type of agent on the screen. 
Setup Go « 
K-alfa 
K-Beta 







What was Understood 
0 
































Figure 26. Interface of the ABM for the Model of Understanding 
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Different initial conditions translate into the different ways a problem can be 
understood depending on the knowledge base, worldviews of an individual, the way the 
problem was perceived, and the time constraints the problem has in order to be 
understood. Given that there are many possible initial conditions, depending on the 
different combinations of K, W, P and WO, a design of experiments (DOE) is needed to 
narrow these possible combinations to a manageable number where results can be 
analyzed and conclusions can be drawn. 
4.4.5 MODEL SIMULATION 
According to Kuhn and Reilly (2002), "DOE seeks to maximize the amount of information 
gained in an experiment by optimizing the combinations of independent variables." This 
is achieved by "manipulating levels or amounts of selected independent variables 
(causes) to examine their influence on dependent variables (effects)" (Fisher, 1960). 










• Window of Opportunity (WO) = time where the problem is amenable to 
be understood. 
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The dependent variables considered in the model are: 
• Time: how long it took for the whole problem to be understood. 
• Effort to Understand: how many mismatches it took for the problem to 
be understood. 
Table 1 shows the factors and levels under which the factors are going to be 
studied. The DOE presents each variable to be experimented at two levels. Given that 
there are seven variables at two levels, 128 experiments are needed (27). Numbers 5 
and 95 reflect the number of agents for each type of K, W, and P. In this case, the 
























Table 1. Factors and Levels of DOE 
The Behavior Space feature of NetLogo was used to conduct the experiments set 
up by the DOE. Initial conditions for the DOE are shown in Appendix A. 
To obtain the data corresponding to dependent variables considered in the 
model, the following setup was followed: 
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• Ten (10) experiments per 128 initial conditions per 3 scenarios (3840 
experiments) were conducted with the purpose of identifying the 
number of runs needed to establish a statistical significance within a 95% 
confidence interval and within a margin of error of 10%, which means 
that 95% of the time, the results will be within 10% of the mean. 95% 
confidence interval is the one adopted traditionally with a 5% margin of 
error. However, 10% margin of error was selected to provide a basis for 
testing the boundary limits of the theory without running an extensive 
number of experiments. The sample number, that gives confidence 
interval and margin of error, can be found in most statistics books. For 
the specific case as it applies to M&S see Kelton, Sadowski, and Sturrock 
(2004). 
• For a 95% confidence interval and within a margin of error of 10% it was 
determined that 250 runs were needed. 
• 128 initial conditions x 250 runs x 3 scenarios = 96000 experiments. 
4.4.6 MODELING ASSUMPTIONS 
As previously mentioned, one of the main advantages of using M&S is that assumptions 
can be made explicit. Even if they are implicit, third parties can question assumptions 
obviated or neglected by the researcher. Assumptions are needed for many reasons, 
among them the necessity to simplify reality and facilitate the modeling process making 
them crucial in the abstraction process. As with any other model, this model has its 
assumptions. Assumptions are driven by the main premise of the modeling effort which 
is to establish a baseline for understanding with the proposed model. This means that 
strategies on how to achieve better understanding, process of learning, and processes 
of problem solving and decision making are purposefully left out and anything that 
conveys what understanding is needs to be considered. 
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Modeling Assumption 1. Closed System 
A closed system seeks to establish the boundaries of the model and assure what is being 
simulated is in fact understanding. The closed system assumption covers three 
assumptions: first, the problem is in a person's head and is not being affected by the 
evolution of the problem in reality. This also assumes that the way the problem arrives 
in a person's head is inconsequential as long as it is there. Having an open system 
eliminates traceability, but more importantly it may be prone to feedback that reflects 
the process of learning. In addition, new problems in the system are a function of 
perception and not of understanding which confounds perception with understanding. 
This would require a learning model that allows for adjustment to the new situation as it 
evolves in reality, which then is no longer an understanding model. In addition, the 
model would require action to affect that reality which then becomes part of a problem 
solving or decision making process. Further, one would need to consider the feedback of 
action which then becomes a learning process. Finally, if how the problem was 
perceived as a problem was to be considered, a formulation of the process of 
perception, or a perception model, would be required which is in itself a separate 
process. Second, the person is limited to the knowledge s/he has. This implies that no 
learning takes place to enhance understanding. Third, worldview and knowledge do not 
mutate. According to the literature, worldview and knowledge are subject to change or 
convert to the opposite kind. Worldview change after action has been taken and 
feedback of a negative outcome prompts the change. Given that no action is 
considered, worldview remains the same. Knowledge converts from one kind to the 
other. However, given that the conditions under which the change happens are not 
specified as part of understanding within the literature, this conversion is not 
considered. 
Modeling Assumption 2. Convergence of Simulation 
On the DOE presented, low level of the factors is not zero. When one of the factors is 
zero, the individual is not able to understand. This assures understanding given 
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unlimited time to run. This also considers not understanding as a form of understanding, 
but it takes it as the effort the individual makes to understand the problem while 
allowing for the consideration of time. In other words, the model considers how much 
effort and how much time it took to understand the problem. 
Modeling Assumption 3. Independence of Problems 
One argument that could be made is that problem agents are related to one another. 
However, this argument brings another assumption: one that requires a unique 
formulation of that structure making it an instantiation of a problem and a limitation to 
establishing the general case. Moreover, a unique formulation denies the possibility of 
alternate formulations which is at the heart of problem situations. Further, the 
existence of many structures is as good as no structure. Finally, the assumption of a 
structure implies that there is some understanding of the problem which says that the 
problem has a structure. All these reasons justify the consideration of a problem to be 
independent of one another; to allow for the establishment of a baseline for 
understanding without introducing any bias. 
Modeling Assumption 4. Independence of Knowledge 
Knowledge may also be considered as the connection of statements we know. However, 
it is not knowable what structure these statements have unless one refers to a specific 
formulation of a specific knowledge base which then becomes an instantiation of a 
knowledge system. Further, knowledge dependence assumes that understanding has 
already occurred and that allows an individual to relate one statement to another. This 
is valid when formulating knowledge based on a machine, but it most definitely does 
not reflect how knowledge is structured in a person's head. In other words, no 
knowledge structure should be assumed. 
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Modeling Assumption 5. Independence of Worldview 
As with problems and knowledge, worldview could also be related. However, for the 
same reason provided above, they should not. One characteristic that is unique of 
worldviews when it comes to independence is that if this is not enforced, one could 
quickly fall into strategies that efficiently and effectively seek structure of behavior 
distancing the effort of establishing a baseline. 
Modeling Assumption 6. Homogeneity of Knowledge, Worldview, and Problem 
This assumption establishes that one statement (K, W, or P) is no more important than 
another. In reality, this is not necessarily true given that some elements of the problem, 
for instance, are likely to be more important than others. The same applies to 
knowledge and worldview. However, if this assumption is not made, just as assumptions 
3, 4, and 5, it is said that something is understood of K, W, and P. The main premise of 
the model is that no previous understanding of anything exists in order to establish a 
baseline with no bias. 
Modeling Assumption 7. Matching of Types and Reusability of K and W 
One of the prevalent premises from the Al account is that of mapping between 
knowledge and problem. This idea of mapping, although, correct is applicable only on 
specific cases where it is known that some elements can in fact be mapped. This is not 
the case in problem situations. One statement can be appropriate to many statements 
(reuse) which truth value is unknown given that the question of appropriateness cannot 
be answered. This would imply knowing in advance the unique solution to that problem 
reflecting previous understanding. Therefore, appropriateness can only be established 
by matching corresponding types of knowledge, worldview, and problem (matching of 
types) and abiding by the propose conditions of understanding. For instance, if a true 
statement is matched with a problem and the statement is not relevant to the problem, 
then even if the types match, the individual is not able to understand. 
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4.5 DATA ANALYSIS 
The purpose of the M&S approach was to facilitate structure and generate data from 
which generalizations can be made. These characteristics are under the establishment 
of a baseline for understanding. A baseline is equivalent to a control condition for 
experimentation. In this particular case, the baseline reflects what was understood as 
independent from possible concurrent processes such as learning or from particular 
techniques such as those used to better understand. 
As a way to guide the analysis, emergence of patterns is sought through results, 
then a qualitative assessment is conducted to establish expectations, and finally a 
quantitative analysis is performed on observations from the qualitative assessment. 
Observations of patterns are based on the graphs generated by the calculations 
of means for 250 experiments for the 128 initial conditions. Figure 27 shows the 
overlapping of effort of the three types of understanding. It is known that the matching 
of K, W and P is what generates understanding or not-understanding and that 
appropriateness is what differentiates one from the other. As presented by Nickerson 
(1988), the best way to study understanding is through not-understanding, which is 
seen as the effort it takes for an individual to understand. Figure 28 shows the 
overlapping of time (an individual takes to understand) of the three types of 
understanding per initial condition. Window of Opportunity is introduced to compare 






























Figure 28. Means Comparison for WP-K, KW-P and KP-W (Time) 
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Time here can be seconds, and it can be weeks. In other words, time does not 
have a unit of measurement, so a person can take on average less time than another, 
yet not know how little. Effort, on the other hand, is measured in the number of 
mismatches among K, W, and P. However, it still serves a categorization purpose. Lastly, 
effort and time can be seen as measures of effectiveness and efficiency of the process of 
understanding: the less effort the more effective our understanding is, the less time the 
more efficient our understanding is. 
As a final note, what the data provides are the observations of what was 
understood given an effort and time. Therefore, the baseline provided by the data, 
assuming that a person understands, is the difference between what was understood 
from different people depending on initial conditions. 
4.5.1 QUALITATIVE ASSESSMENT 
Figure 27 (see Appendix B for the corresponding data) shows that indeed there is an 
apparent common behavior for the three types of understanding in terms of effort. Two 
observations are made: 
• The three types of understanding have a similar pattern when it comes to 
effort. 
• In addition, four distinct levels are observed. Levels 1 to 3 are in the few 
thousands whereas level 4 is in the ten thousands. These levels need to 
be further explored. 
Figure 28 (see Appendix C for the corresponding data) shows that the three 
types of understanding do not present a discernable pattern in terms of time as it is in 
terms of effort. However, observations can be made: in most cases KW-P takes less time 
than WP-K and KP-W. This needs to be explored. 
Although there are three types of understanding that need analysis, it is noted 
that: 
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One of the three types of understanding is going to be used for analysis in 
terms of effort. Although they may prove to be statistically different, for 
simplification purposes, they are considered the same. The analysis of the 
other two is conducted on the need to basis. 
KP-W is selected for the analysis of the data. This is because it is the one 
with the most normally distributed initial conditions or approximately 
normally distributed out of the three (see Table 2). P-values need to be > 
= 0.05 to not reject the normality assumption. This assumption must be 
assessed to perform parametric analysis. 
Analysis of time is to be conducted on the need to basis as a complement 
of to the analysis of effort because, unlike effort, time does not present 
an apparent overall pattern that can guide the analysis. 

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2. Kolmogorov-Smirnov Normality Test for WP-K, KW-P, and KP-W (p-values) 
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4.5.2 QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
In the qualitative assessment it is found that, when referring to effort, there seems to be 
levels as observed in Figure 29. It was found that what apparently looked like four levels 
are instead seven. Levels 1 to 4 are shown in Figure 29. Level 1 is located between 
values 0 and 50, level 2 between values 150 and 250, level 3 between values 250 and 
350, and level 4 between values 500 and 600 for all three types of understanding. 
i 30° N ! 




0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Condition 
Figure 29. Levels 1, 2, 3, and 4 (Effort) 
S 
-D OWP-K • KW-P 
AKP-W 
Figure 30 shows levels 5 and 6. Level 5 is located between values 1500 and a 
little over 2000 and level 6 with values between 3000 and 4000 for all three types of 
understanding. It is noted that while variation in levels 1 to 4 is in the few tenths, 
variation in levels 5 and 6 are in the hundreds. Figure 31 shows level 7 which for all 
three levels varies in the tens of thousands. 
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Figure 30. Levels 5 and 6 (Effort) 
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Figure 31. Level 7 (Effort) 
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To study these levels, comparison of means was conducted using one-way 
ANOVA. ANOVA or analysis of variance uses the F-test to test the hypothesis concerning 
the means of three or more populations. Here, ANOVA is used to compare the means of 
three or more samples. 
Level 1 









































































Table 3. Level 1 Initial Conditions 
A Levene test for homogeneity of variances was conducted (Table 4) for level 1. 
This test says that variances are not homogeneous. No homogeneity can be due to 
condition 111 because its data are not distributed normally (p=0.04). Moreover, the 
significance value of 0.01 of the F test suggests that means of the eight conditions are 
not comparable (Table 5). 


































Table 5. F Test for Level 1 


























Figure 32. Plot of Means for Level 1 (Effort) 
It can be observed that condition 111 is the one that presents a mean that seems 
extreme compared to the rest. It is noted that data transformation was not conducted 
in condition 111 because it would still not be able to compare it to the other conditions 
given that the mean will be dramatically different. Table 6 shows the Levene test for 
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conditions 1, 13, 33, 45, 67, 79, and 99. Now that their variances are homogeneous, 
ANOVA can be used. The F test for these conditions gives a p = 0.158 which suggests 
that conditions at level 1, excluding condition 111, are not statistically different (Table 
7). 

































Table 7. F Test for Level 1 (Excluding Condition 111) 
According to the data, condition 111 should not be considered within level 1. 
However, given that there is no other sublevel, it is considered within level 1 for 
assessment. 
Level 1 low effort is due to the low level of problem (both Pa and Pp) combined 
with either high or low level of both knowledge (both Ka and Kp) and worldview (both 
Wa and Wp). It is noted the uniformity of knowledge and worldview on either high or 
low levels. This means that no combination of high and low knowledge or high and low 
worldview is present. 
The fact that the means at this level are not statistically different provides insight 
into a common preconception: more knowledge implies better understanding. Based on 
the data: 
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• Looking at conditions 1 and 67, they are statistically equivalent; they have 
low and high knowledge levels respectively keeping worldview, problem, 
and WO at same levels. In other words, more knowledge does not imply 
less effort (better understanding). It is noted that "better understanding" 
is seen here in terms of effort. 
• More worldview does not imply better understanding, in terms of effort 
(see conditions 1 and 13). 
• Finally, a high setting on WO does not imply better understanding, in 
terms of effort. When comparing conditions 67 and 99 and conditions 13 
and 45 it can be seen that they are statistically equivalent. It is noted that 
all these assessments are made at level 1. 
The previous bullets give us insight into one important aspect: better 
understanding. Better understanding, in this case, is inferred from all different 
conditions. In other words, given a problem perception and WO of the problem, the 
best setting combination of knowledge and worldview to achieve understanding with 
less effort can be found when looking at the tables of the different levels and the 
corresponding output. 
Although conditions in level 1 have comparable means in terms of effort, in 
terms of time they do not. In order to compare means in terms of time, normality tests 
for all conditions are needed (see Appendix E). It can be observed from the normality 
test for time that most conditions are not normally distributed, so ANOVA cannot be 
used. Instead, the Kruskal-Wallis non-parametric test is used. The Kruskal-Wallis test is 
used when the assumption of normality does not hold. Table 8 shows the Kruskal-Wallis 










a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b- Grouping Variable: Condition 
Table 8. Kruskal-Wallis Test for Level 1 (Time) 
The test shows the asymptotic significance that estimates that the probability of 
obtaining a chi-square statistic greater than or equal to the one displayed if there truly is 
no difference between the group ranks. In this case, a chi-square of 1369.854 with 6 
degrees of freedom should occur about 0 times per 1000. In other words, conditions 
within level one are statistically different. It is noted that the test was run without 
condition 1 given that it was a value that could skew the analysis (see Figure 33). 
Figure 33. Plot of Means for Level 1 (Time) 
Figure 33 provides three important insights: 
92 
• The positive impact of worldview is evident when comparing conditions 1 
and 13 showing that it reduces the time needed to understand. The same 
can be said about the effect of knowledge when comparing conditions 1 
and 67. Although intuitively it could be considered that condition 1 is the 
most unfortunate condition, given low levels of everything, it is not the 
one that takes the longest to understand across levels. 
• Further, when comparing condition 45 and 99, the effect of high 
worldview is very similar to the effect of high knowledge when problem 
and WO are at high settings (1223 and 1333 time units respectively). 
Conditions 13 and 67 are "close enough" (1818 and 2224 respectively) 
serving to speculate the effect of worldview and the effect of knowledge 
are similar when WO is low. 
• Comparing table 5 and figure 35, it is observed that more knowledge 
and/or more worldview speed up the understanding process at this level. 
Table 9 shows a Mann-Whitney U test comparing conditions 45 and 99 that 
confirms the suspicion that high knowledge and high worldview, when the problem is at 
low and WO is at high setting, are equivalent. Mann-Whitney U test is used because 
these conditions are not normally distributed. Table 10, on the other hand, proves the 
suspicion that conditions 13 and 67 are equivalent under the same knowledge, 
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a. Grouping Variable: VAR00002 
Table 10. Mann-Whitney U Test comparing Conditions 13 and 67 (Time) 
The effect of WO still needs to be evaluated in terms of time. It was shown that 
in terms of effort, it does not make a difference high or low WO. Comparing conditions 
67 and 99 (same settings, but different WO) the Mann-Whitney U test shows that the 
two conditions are not statistically equivalent (Table 11). In other words, WO makes a 











a. Grouping Variable: VAR00002 
Table 11. Mann-Whitney U Test comparing Conditions 67 and 99 (Time) 











a. Grouping Variable: VAR00002 
Table 12. Mann-Whitney U Test comparing Conditions 79 and 111 (Time) 
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Finally, note that although more knowledge and/or worldview in terms of effort 
do not mean better understanding, in terms of time apparently they do. However, note 
that, as it was previously mentioned, time is not the best variable to use for comparison 
within a level given that it does not abide by the same pattern as effort. One situation 
could be that condition 1 is better compared to another condition on a different level. 
This is explored later in the document. 
Now, assessing whether the three types of understanding are equivalent to one 
another in level 1, as it is suggested by observation 1 (in terms of effort), presents a 
difficulty, which spawns from the normality of the data on WP-K and KW-P. Whereas for 
KP-W only condition 111 is not normally distributed, conditions 33, 45, 67, and 79 are 
not normally distributed as well for either WP-K or KW-P. Figure 34 shows the means 














































Figure 34. Comparison of Means of KP-W, KW-P, and WP-K at Level 1 (Effort) 
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The data were not transfomed because at least one of the three types had a 
condition normally distributed. However, Figure 34 could be used to speculate, based 
on the data, and draw a conclusion: 
• Depending on the condition, whereas some of the three types of 
understanding are equivalent, there are others were one type is better 
than the other. For instance, conditions 79 and 99 clearly show a major 
advantage of WP-K over its counterparts, in terms of effort. This 
advantage is not as obvious in conditions 1 and 13 for instance. 
This speculation can be confirmed by comparing conditions 1,13, and 99 for the 
three types of understanding. These conditions are the only ones, common to the three 
types that are normally distributed. Appendix F shows the test results when comparing 
conditions 1,13 and 99 respectively for the three types (Levene and F-Tests). 
For conditions 1 and 13 the F test shows that the three types of understanding 
are statistically equivalent showing that one type is not better than the other. On the 
other hand, condition 99 shows that the three are not statistically equivalent, but KP-W 
and KW-P are. In addition, the mean of WP-K is significantly lower than its counterparts. 
The Tukey HSD (honestly significant difference) test compares condition 99 for 
the three types of understanding and shows the equivalence of KP-W and KW-P (type 1 
and 2 respectively in Table 13). By type 3 (WP-K) having the lowest value and being 
statistically different from KP-W and KW-P, it can be concluded that WP-K takes less 




















Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
a- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 250.000. 
Table 13. Tukey HSD Comparing Condition 99 for KP-W, KW-P and WP-K at Level 1 
A possible explanation of why WP-K is better than its counterparts lies in the 
availability of knowledge when WP-K takes place. For WP-K, when problem and 
worldview are at low settings, there is an abundance of K for the matching when the 
problem is being formulated (WP), whereas for KP-W and for KW-P there is a low 
availability of W. The low setting of W has an impact when it is needed for KP and when 
K needs to be formulated (KW). This result is counterintuitive because one would expect 
that the types that benefit the most from high settings of knowledge are KP-W and KW-
P, not WP-K. In addition, WP-K has the added benefit of a high WO that KP-W cannot 
capitalize on. 
Another interesting point for discussion is condition 111. This condition shows 
that KP-W is better than WP-K and WP-K is better than KW-P despite high settings of K 
and W. Given that condition 111 is not normally distributed, a non-parametric test is 
used to compare two types of understanding at the time. When comparing KP-W and 













a. Grouping Variable: VAR00002 
Table 14. Mann-Whitney U comparing Condition 111 for KP-W and KW-P 
However, when comparing KP-W with WP-K and WP-K with KW-P, they are 
statistically equivalent according to the same test (Table 15 and Table 16 respectively). It 
seems counterintuitive that KP-W is better than KW-P if K and W are at high settings. 
The explanation is the same as in the previous case. There is an abundance of W for KP-
W when needed. KW-P is the worst because the abundance of both knowledge and 
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a. Grouping Variable: VAR00002 
Table 16. Mann-Whitney U Test comparing Condition 111 for KW-P and WP-K 
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Two important conclusions can be drawn so far: 
• Although the three types of understanding are equivalent, it remains to 
be shown if it is the general case. It is shown that each condition must be 
evaluated to establish which type is better. 
• In addition, it is not necessarily about what factor, knowledge, worldview, 
problem or WO, is high or low. It is about the combination of factors 
when they are at high or low settings. This is the reason why each 
condition must be evaluated independently when comparing KP-W, KW-P 
and WP-K. 
Assessing whether the three types of understanding are equivalent to one 
another in terms of time presents a major challenge because, unlike the analysis of 
effort, time distributions are not normally distributed in their great majority (see 
Appendix E). 
As with effort, we can draw speculations based on the data. Figure 35 shows the 
means for level one for the three types of understanding in terms of time. 
It can be observed that the three types have a similar overall behavior with the 
exception of condition 1. It is noted that although overall behavior is similar, at the 
condition level it may be very different given issues of the scale of the axis used in the 
graph. This is shown in Figure 36 where most means may not be comparable. However, 
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Figure 36. Comparison of Means for KP-W, KW-P, and WP-K at Level 1 (Scaled 1) 
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Comparing condition 67 for the three types of understanding KP-W, KW-P, and 
WP-K , the Kruskal-Wallis Test shows that the three types are not statistically equivalent 
(Table 17). From the graph, it can be concluded that KW-P performs better than its 
counterparts. On the other hand, when comparing the three types for condition 45, the 
Kruskal-Wallis Test shows that they are statistically equivalent (Table 18). For this 









a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
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a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b- Grouping Variable: Type 
Table 18. Kruskal-Wallis Test for Condition 45 (Time) 
This concludes the analysis of level l 4 . 
4.6 THEORY BUILDING FROM DATA ANALYSIS 
Generalizing from the data, it is shown that an individual's effort to understand always 
converges to one of seven levels. This is an emergent output. Out of 128 different initial 
4 The remainder of the data analysis can be found in Appendix D. 
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conditions representing at least 128 different individuals only seven levels of effort 
emerged. 128 conditions are due to combinations of knowledge, worldview, problem, 
and time constraint. Given that effort is seen as the difficulty of a problem to be 
understood by a particular individual, it makes sense to establish that the higher the 
effort the more complex the person considers the problem. In other words, levels of 
effort can be seen as subjective levels of complexity. 
These levels are not equidistant from one another. Level 6 is greater than level 5, 
but level 7 is much greater than level 6. This implies that an individual at level 7 will 
have much more difficulty understanding a problem than an individual at level 5, for 
instance. 
What makes one level more complex for one individual than another is the 
alignment and balance of knowledge and worldview types with respect to problem type. 
It is about the number of the three types of statements when matched. Succinctly, when 
comparing two levels or conditions across levels, one should look at each initial 
condition given that the number of statements may increase the chances of 





































C108:Ka, Kp, Wp/Pp 
C106:Kp, Wp/Pp 
CI2: Ka, Wp/Pp 
C8: Ka, Wa / Pp 
Table 19. Balance of Statements 
Considering alignment, comparing level 7 with level 5b, for instance, it is 
observed that having Wp instead of Wa reduces the level of effort (less mismatching 
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among the three types of statements). However, comparing level 5b and 5a (two 
conditions within the same level), changing Ka for Kp does not make a difference. Yet 
adding K^ a reduction of effort is observed. This is due to balance. Ka, even though it 
does not compensate for Pp, it does compensate for Pa despite their low numbers. The 
concept of alignment and balance also suggest that one level is not more complex than 
another because of how high or how low the number of statements is. Level 4, for 
instance, presents high numbers of Pa and Pp with low and high numbers of Ka, Kp, Wo, 
and Wp. Yet, there are another three levels, above and below, where more and less 
effort is required to understand. 
Alignment explains why systems engineering, for instance, is considered to be 
better addressed by knowledge about structure with worldview about structure. 
However, it also highlights the need to balance knowledge and worldview about 
structure with knowledge or worldview about behavior. This insight also suggests that 
the systemic idea that more elements imply more complexity, within understanding, is 
not the general case. When something has few elements and yet difficult to understand 
explains why emergence is difficult to predict and understand. In this case, complexity 
is not about the number of parts, but about their emergent behavior and the knowledge 
and worldview to recognize that emergence. If seen by the number of parts, problems 
with many parts are considered extremely complex. However, if the problem is looked 
by the emergence of the parts, the problem becomes simple. 
Another insight is about the common idea that more knowledge implies more 
understanding. Data show that this is not the case. Level 1 and level 4 show that under 
same problem conditions, effort does not decrease due to higher knowledge and/or 
worldview. All reduces to the concept of alignment and balance. 
Insight this far has been gathered from analysis of effort to understand on one 
type of understanding (mostly KP-W). Time to understand and comparing types of 
understanding (KP-W, KW-P, and WP-K) provide three main insights. The first is that 
higher time does not necessarily imply higher effort. In other words, because a person 
takes longer to understand, does not mean that it requires more effort. This sounds 
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counterintuitive. However, this is due to a low number of statements that need to be 
matched. Nonetheless, the problem is still considered complex by that individual 
because it took a long time to be understood. Time then becomes a factor of why a 
problem may be considered more complex for one individual than for another. This 
case can be observed in condition 4 in level 6. Conversely, less time does not necessarily 
imply less effort. This can be observed in condition 24 in level 7. The second insight 
states that unlike effort, a larger number of the three types of statement imply less 
understanding time. Further, given that KP-W and WP-K depend on time restrictions, 
more time implies faster understanding. This is not the case for KW-P as it does not 
depend on time. The third insight relates to the fact that one type of understanding may 
be better than another depending on the initial conditions. For instance, KW-P in most 
cases performed better in terms of time than its counterparts. However, in most cases it 
performed worse in terms of effort compared to its counterparts. Condition 8 in level 7 
shows this case. This shows that an individual should consider, besides the initial 
condition, the type of understanding it uses in order to better understand. 
Considering effort and time, and also by the comparison of the three types of 
understanding it is shown that understanding can be subjectively quantified. This is 
possible in the ideal case where the number of statements of knowledge, worldview, 
and problem can be quantified as well. An individual may be able to predict the amount 
of time or effort it takes to understand a problem. Further, the individual could also 
predict which type of understanding is better depending on the problem at hand, 
considering available knowledge and worldview. 
Finally, if an individual were to consider effort, time, and type of understanding, 
it may be able to pinpoint conditions where understanding is easier or more difficult to 
achieve. In other words, a combination of such elements could lead to better 
understanding which consequently leads to less complexity. 
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4.7 SUMMARY OF TOWARDS A GENERAL THEORY OF UNDERSTANDING 
This section presented an initial general theory of understanding (GTU). It is called 
general because it explains the two existing schools of understanding found in the body 
of knowledge. In addition, it shows a new third school of thought. To build the GTU, 
insight from a built axiomatic structure and insight from data are used. The axiomatic 
structure provides a precise way of defining understanding through the definition of 
terms such as knowledge, worldview, and problem. In addition, a theoretical 
representation of the axiomatic structure is provided in the form of the Understanding 
Construct (UC). Through the use of the UC a simulation is created. Data are obtained 
from the simulation insights drawn. Using effort to understand as a metric, it is shown 
that different individual profiles converge to only seven levels of effort to understand. 
Levels of effort show that individuals consider problems more complex at higher levels 
than at lower levels. Consequently, understanding contributes to a problem being more 
or less complex. Figure 37 shows some of the main contributions of this work to the 
body of knowledge (BOK). 
Feedback 
V 
• Explanation of what understanding is, what it 
does, and how it does it. 
• Formal presentation of the concept through 
the establishment of a construct 
• Third School of Thought (WP-K) 
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Figure 37. Contribution of General Theory of Understanding to BOK 
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5 DERIVED THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
Understanding's overarching umbrella covers a wide spectrum of individuals 
encompassing scientists, politicians, and regular people. When scientists do research, 
they match their knowledge to problems under a particular worldview. The worldview, 
in this case, becomes their form of justifying their scientific endeavors. When politicians 
propose reforms, they match their knowledge to constituents' problems under the 
worldview of their political party which in terms is supported by their own. Regular 
people's process of understanding is no different from scientist or politicians. There is 
still the same process of matching knowledge and worldview to day-to-day problems. 
The concept of understanding is one of the few that has many ramifications on day to 
day life. 
Figure 38 shows how the GTU provides insights not only about the phenomenon 
of understanding itself, but also how this phenomenon affects areas of interest to 
Engineering Management (EM). In terms of the concept of understanding, it contributes 
to the BOK by providing an explanation about the phenomenon. Areas of interest to EM, 
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Figure 38. Theoretical Implications of the GTU 
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Some of the main accounts of the different areas where this work has an impact 
are presented in the following sections. 
5.1 ON UNDERSTANDING 
An unambiguous concept of understanding was proposed by providing a set of 
formalized bases. The concept allows the researcher to answer four basic questions: 
What is understanding? What does understanding do? How does understanding do 
what it does? Why does understanding do what it does? The answers to these questions 
are: 
• As a process, understanding is the matching of knowledge, worldview, and 
problem. 
• As an output, understanding is the result of the assignment of a truth value 
to a problem. 
• Understanding does assign truth values to problems. 
• The process of the matching, how, occurs in one of three forms: KP-W, 
understanding a problem through knowledge application; KW-P, 
understanding a problem through knowledge formulation; and WP-K, 
understanding a problem through the formulation of the problem. 
• Understanding assigns truth values to problems because it creates 
knowledge. 
Ontologically, understanding is presented as a duality by providing process and 
substantive perspectives. This covers the two predominant perspectives in the body of 
knowledge when describing understanding. 
Understanding provides the creation of knowledge and worldview. 
Understanding creates knowledge because when problems are assigned truth values, by 
definition, they become knowledge. This has a direct impact in Knowledge Management 
(KM) where the Knowledge Conversion process (Nonaka & Takeuchi, 1995) is widely 
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accepted as a knowledge creation process. Understanding creates worldview because 
what was understood can be communicated through an explanation. An explanation is a 
statement about statements which by definition is a worldview. This presents 
understanding not only as a knowledge creation process, but also as a worldview 
creation process. Worldview is not considered within the definition of understanding 
given that, in the general case, it cannot be assessed. Understanding as a worldview 
creation process is of particular importance given that in the body of knowledge there is 
no indication of a particular process that generates worldview. Further, the 
consideration of understanding as a knowledge creation process, although intuitively 
correct, can now be explained based on the definitions provided. It is important to note 
that knowledge created through understanding would not abide by epistemology's 
definition of knowledge as justified true belief from a correspondence point of view. 
This is because knowledge, when created by understanding under this model, has not 
been externally justified and truthfulness has not been evaluated. However, it does 
fulfill the definition of justified true belief from a coherent point of view given that it is 
only the understanding of one person. That individual builds a system of premises out of 
the matching of its knowledge, worldview, and problem. 
Assessment of what was understood is sought after in the body of knowledge. 
However, it is always under the assumptions of objectivity and a knowable problem. 
Within a problem situation, by definition, nothing can be objectively defined or 
completely known given different understandings and reality limitations. A basic 
subjective evaluation of what was understood is simply the yes/no answer to the 
questions, "Did you understand?", "Did you not understand?" or "Were you able to 
understand?" Misunderstanding cannot be evaluated within a problem situation either. 
By definition, misunderstanding is the number of statements with wrongly assigned 
truth values out of the ones that needed assignment. Misunderstanding can be 
evaluated then within an objectively defined problem with a known solution. 
Another important implication of the theory, relates to appropriateness. Unlike 
the perspective suggested in Moore and Newell (1974) whose consideration of 
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appropriateness of understanding is only when the resulting assignment of truth value is 
true, this theory considers when the assignment is false. This says that not-
understanding is a form of understanding where the individual is aware that it did not 
understand. This is consistent with Nickerson (1988) when he says that "awareness of 
ignorance - at one level can be evidence of understanding at another level." Besides 
appropriateness, other three conditions of understanding were defined: existence, 
capacity, and relevance. These are also of great importance. If one of the main 
components, problem, knowledge, or worldview, is missing then the person is not able 
to understand. Not being able to understand is different from not-understanding. In the 
former, understanding or not-understanding will not be achieved for any of three 
reasons: a problem was not perceived, there is no knowledge that is relevant to the 
problem, or there is no worldview relevant to the problem. It is emphasized that 
understanding as well as not-understanding depend on all three at the same time: 
knowledge, worldview, and problem. 
A person can, for instance, have knowledge and not understand a problem. This 
is because at the very least, the person must have had understood relevant knowledge 
to the problem first. The subjective test case here is to say that if a person understood a 
problem then at least the knowledge used to understand the problem is also 
understood. 
5.2 ON SHARED UNDERSTANDING 
Considering two individuals at different effort levels, an individual at level 1, for 
instance, may believe that s/he understood better than someone at level seven. In a 
group dynamic the first individual may judge itself better able to understand a problem 
at hand than the second one. However, this is not necessarily the case because 
individuals are departing from different problem formulation, knowledge base, and 
worldview base. Therefore, what it was understood cannot be objectively assessed and 
much less compared. This lack of assessment and consensus, typical of problem 
situations, may not only be about social problems. For instance, if an individual is 
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understanding a problem about behavior, it is agreed in the body of knowledge that 
consensus with another individual is very unlikely because of the nature of the problem. 
Data show that even if the problem is about structure, when individuals are at extreme 
levels of effort, reaching a consensus seems to be extremely difficult. Different 
worldview and knowledge are at play when a person is understanding a problem. 
Consensus implies that worldview and knowledge among individuals, even when it 
relates to problems about structure, need to be the same. Going even further, if one 
person is understanding a problem as a problem about behavior, while the other is 
understanding it as a problem about structure consensus is also very unlikely. This 
suggests that problem situations can be about technical problems when people refer to 
different solutions depending on their knowledge and worldview. 
These arguments lead to the idea that problem situations may be about lack of 
shared understanding. This suggests that shared understanding is good but perhaps 
difficult to achieve. 
In the hypothetical case, when an individual desires to develop a metric that 
assesses what was understood on a particular problem, conditions require the 
assessment to be bounded. Some basic conditions could be: 
• Define statements (knowledge, problem, and worldview) for each 
individual involved in the problem. 
• Assess the common ones. 
• Allow individuals to match statements. 
• Assess the types of understanding used. 
• Compare explanations and knowledge generated. 
In reality, generating this list is very unlikely. When referring to shared understanding, 
based on the proposed definitions, this is what individuals do. How it is done is not clear 
in this research. However, what it is clear is the extreme difficulty of achieving such a 
concept. 
110 
As with understanding, shared understanding is a commonly used concept yet its 
implications are overlooked. In order to have some degree of shared understanding, one 
must guarantee that, besides having common knowledge, problem, and worldview 
among the people involved, a common match must exist. In other words, if shared 
understanding is defined as the intersection of matching then the intersection cannot be 
an empty set. 
Shared understanding, or lack thereof, can be blamed for many failed projects. 
From this perspective, assuming shared understanding among individuals assumes these 
individuals have a common knowledge base, common worldview base, and common 
perception of a problem. In addition, it assumes they share the way the three were 
matched. As it can be inferred, assumption of one may be damaging enough. On the 
other hand, considering that different worldview may be beneficial to make decisions, 
the question of whether shared understanding is beneficial to decision making needs to 
be formulated. This seemingly opposite view can be explained by differentiating 
consensus from shared understanding. Whereas consensus about decisions may be 
needed to enact decisions affecting a group, different understanding, or lack of shared 
understanding, may be the best output even if it hurdles consensus. This situation may 
be deemed acceptable in organizations when different individuals bring different 
perspectives and expertise to a discussion. In these situations, it is accepted that no one 
has full understanding about the situation at hand and that anyone may be right or 
wrong. This is characteristic of problem situations. 
5.3 ON THE ROLE OF UNDERSTANDING IN COMPLEXITY 
A major contribution of this work is the premise that highlights understanding as a key 
human component of complexity. Complexity is an issue of interest to systems 
engineers and project managers among others. 
Within projects and in day-to-day activities, problems are understood differently 
by different people. This is especially true when it comes to problem situations. What 
this work suggests is a way of subjectively assessing complexity through understanding. 
I l l 
Using effort to understand as a metric, an individual is able to categorize how high or 
how low the difficulty of understanding the problem is. For instance, if knowledge 
elicitation techniques are extended to worldview and problem elicitation then such 
subjective evaluation is feasible by considering the types of statements (alpha or beta). 
In addition, it is feasible to assess how long it may take to understand such a problem. In 
both cases it is a probabilistic assessment based on the number of statements. 
A metric could also be useful to better define strategies to improve 
understanding. If an individual is able to assess in which level of effort it is placed, 
strategies that allow it to move from higher to lower levels could also be devised. 
Among these strategies could be to target switching or acquisition of suitable 
worldview, switching or acquisition of suitable knowledge and even considering 
extending the scope of the problem to consider both problems about structure and 
behavior. Further, the strategies could also consider which type of understanding to use 
in order to make the process more efficient or possibly more effective. 
It is safe to assume that some conditions for an individual, given a problem, are 
more conducive to understanding or to better understanding, than others. Trainers and 
decision makers may be interested in reducing the complexity of a problem for a 
particular individual. This leads to the design of strategies that, considering the same 
problem for an individual, it may be able to adjust into or gain new worldview, acquire 
or consider other existing knowledge. If this is the case, the goal is to decrease the level 
of effort that it takes for an individual to understand. This is the inverse situation to say, 
what conditions could lead an individual to better understanding. 
From this perspective, trainers and decision makers, for instance, may be 
interested in focusing on assessing the number of statements an individual has 
reflecting amount of knowledge, worldview, and problem. More importantly, they may 
be interested on how to change these amounts to a desired level given the same 
problem for that individual. For instance, looking at conditions 8 and 12, it is shown that 
the individual needs to switch worldview to effectively move from level 7 to 5. 
Moreover, looking at conditions 12 and 108 the individual needs to acquire more 
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C108:Ka, Kp, Wp/Pp 
C12: Ka, Wp/Pp 
C8: Ka , Wa / Pp 
Table 20. Reducing Complexity through Better Understanding 
In this example, condition 8 has a high number of known statements about 
structure (Ka), and a high number of statements about structure about statements (Wa) 
on a high number of unknown statements about behavior (PP)). To move from level 7 to 
level 5 it is at least required that the individual changes to statements about behavior 
about statements (Wp). If the interest is to move from level 7 to level 3, then the 
individual not only need to switch from Wp to W^ but also acquire Kp. This is considering 
the initial perception of the problem is kept. 
This insight provides trainers and decision makers what they need to reduce the 
complexity of a problem for an individual. It may be cheaper or easier to send the 
individual to learn new knowledge, which is what traditionally is done. However, it may 
not be as simple to train for switching or acquiring new worldview. This also shows that 
in the ideal case where the number of statements of knowledge, worldview, and 
problem, can be quantified an individual may be able to predict the amount of effort it 
takes to understand a problem. 
Engineering Managers are focused on improving the state of things, in this case, 
possibly improving understanding. However, the converse is also true; Engineering 
Managers may purposefully present problems to people where effort to understand is 
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high. This could be of use in training, for instance, where the need to switch worldview 
or change the scope of problems could be of use in decision making activities. This is 
supported by the decision-making literature. It has been shown that problems under 
stress are possibly solvable when worldview is switched. From the proposed definitions, 
a switch in worldview undoubtedly leads to changes on problem and knowledge 
formulation. All these aspects prompt to consider besides training for acquisition of 
knowledge and worldview, to consider strategies for worldview creation and worldview 
switching 
5.4 ON UNDERSTANDING AND CONCURRENT PROCESSES 
Understanding is an integral part of concurrent cognitive processes. This explains why, 
in the literature, understanding is convoluted with some of these processes. The GTU 
provides a way to differentiate the process of understanding from these processes. 
The first process with which understanding is embedded is that of perception. 
Perception posits how an individual senses her/his surroundings. Worldview for instance 
is considered in the body of knowledge as a form of perception. However, worldview, 
from the literature as well, is also about describing reality. Perception in this case is 
affected or steered by worldview in terms of predispositions or predominant worldview. 
An individual may choose to deal with one type of problem over another because s/he is 
predisposed to see the one s/he is predisposed to. This is explained by Bozkurt et al. 
(2007) and Bozkurt (2009). Through perception, an individual has access to reality and to 
this extent, it is used for decision making and/or learning. Decision making in this case 
could be a reactive process based on perception. In terms of learning, perception 
provides access to knowledge. In terms of understanding, perception provides, at the 
very least, access to problems. 
Understanding is also associated with problem solving, decision making, and 
learning. Seeing problem solving as the execution of a solution and decision making as 
the evaluation of solutions, a solution is either a possible output of or input to the 
process of understanding. In the former, understanding assigns truth value to problems 
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in order to generate a solution. In the latter, the solution is the problem whose truth 
values need to be evaluated. This explains Rittel and Webber's (1973) statement of "the 
information needed to understand the problem depends on one's idea for solving it." 
This says that a solution is a problem that needs to be understood. 
Seeing learning as the acquisition of knowledge, understanding is then the use of 
knowledge. Therefore, knowledge must have been learnt to understand. In addition, 
understanding generates knowledge that may or may not be learned. 
In connecting the processes of perception, learning, decision making, problem 
solving, and understanding, Sterman (1994) presents a description of this connective 
process as learning: 
All learning depends on feedback. We make decisions that alter the real 
world; we receive information feedback about the real world, and using 
the new information we revise our understanding of the world and the 
decisions we make to bring the state closer to out goals. 
However, in Sterman's description there is a description of each one of the 
mentioned processes. Using Sterman's description as a baseline and based on working 
definitions, the connective process can be presented as: learning depends on feedback 
from the enactment of our understanding in the form of solutions. These solutions alter 
the real world; we observe these changes and using these changes as new knowledge 
and problems we revise what we had understood of the world. This revision of 
understanding results in the revision of our solutions which brings us closer to our goals. 
This description uses the definitions of knowledge and problem only. 
In this process: 
• Understanding generates knowledge (of solutions). 
• This knowledge is enacted in decision making. 
• Reality is altered due to decision making. 
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• Changes in reality are observed. 
• From these changes knowledge and problems are learned. 
• New knowledge and newly found problems are used to revise understanding. 
From this process, not only do we acquire knowledge through learning but also 
problems and worldview. Individuals can learn about the existence of problems through 
feedback, perception, or by being told about them. These problems may or may not 
affect the individuals. If individuals are affected by these problems, then they may 
decide to understand them and/or take action on them. Individuals can learn worldview 
by cultural, political, educational, or religious influences among others. This process can 
be further expanded. For instance, the individual learns about problems through 
feedback, perception, or simply being told about them. Problems can also be generated 
by the process of understanding when it is being revised. In this case, something that 
was considered knowledge can now be re-evaluated and it can be decided that the 
assigned truth value is neither true nor false. Then knowledge becomes a problem. 
Process-wise, this connective process can be seen as: through 
sensation/intuition (perception) new knowledge, problem, and worldview are acquired 
(learning); knowledge, problem, and worldview are matched (understanding), action or 
reaction (decision making/problem solving) is taken based on perception, learning, or 
understanding. Object-wise, through sensing/intuition knowledge, worldview, and 
problem are perceived and learnt. Understanding uses learnt knowledge, worldview, 
and problem and generates knowledge, worldview, and problem. The knowledge and 
worldview generated are used to solve problems or make decisions. Worldview is also 
used to reshape perception. Object-wise, this process represents an autopoietic process 
when it generates the elements needed to make the process work, in this case, its own 
input. 
Understanding is at the heart of this autopoietic process by being autopoietic 
itself; understanding generates knowledge, worldview, and problem. It generates 
knowledge and feeds on it to yet create new knowledge. It generates worldview and 
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feeds on it through its own explanations about the world to create new explanations. 
Finally, it generates problems when re-evaluating knowledge and feeds on them to 
generate new ones. In this case each knowledge, worldview, and problem may create 
knowledge, worldview and problem. However, this is a pure rationalist argument where 
the process feeds itself. Given that individuals deal with reality, this is not the general 
case. This is a reason why understanding needs the other processes; to make decisions 
and learn in order to revise what was understood. The interaction with the environment 
is needed to maintain the autopoietic process running. 
5.5 ON AGENT-BASED MODELING AND SIMULATION 
The implications on ABM are twofold: one methodologically corresponding to M&S and 
the second corresponding to the design of agents. In terms of methodology, this work 
uses agents for theory building. Traditionally, agents are used to build theory out of the 
identification of single rules from observations of the phenomenon of interest. These 
rules create emergent patterns that give rise to the new theory. In this work, the 
phenomenon is not observed. Single rules about the phenomenon are obtained from 
existing theories instead. Like the traditional case, emergence is observed and used to 
build new theory. Further, while simulation provides emergence, modeling provides a 
traceable axiomatic structure that formalizes the theory building process. 
This methodological approach provides researchers with new ways of exploring 
little understood phenomena, especially where little theoretical consensus exists. This is 
of special interest to EM given the soft nature of many topics encountered within the 
discipline. In this case, it opens the possibility to formalize soft topics that are usually 
conveyed through argumentative means. In other words, it provides an objective means 
for discussing soft topics. 
In terms of the design of agents, according to Tolk and Uhrmacher (2009), 
understanding is at the core of an agent in the form of sense making. Further, they 
relate sense making to processes such as perception and decision making within an 
agent. This relation similarly describes the autopoietic process suggested in the previous 
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section. Tolk and Uhrmacher (2009) present an architectural framework addressing the 
main agents' characteristics. This framework was covered in section 3. The autopoietic 
process could contribute to the framework by considering: 
• Worldview affecting perception through predispositions. 
• Memory storing learnt knowledge, worldview, and problem from the 
environment. 
• Decision making and problem solving considered as one process called 
action generation. 
• Perception, learning, and understanding affecting action generation. 
• Adaptation being removed as it could be considered a function of 
perception, learning, understanding, and action generation. 
• Understanding taking the place of sense making and affecting and being 
affected by perception, learning, and action generation. 
5.6 SUMMARY OF DERIVED THEORETICAL IMPLICATIONS 
This section presented the main contributions to and implications of the GTU on the 
topic of understanding and on areas of interest to Engineering Management (EM). 
In terms of understanding, the GTU allows for defining related concepts such as 
those of misunderstanding, lack of understanding, and inability to understand. 
Additionally, understanding is presented as a knowledge and worldview creation 
process. This has a direct implication on Knowledge Management (KM). KM is of 
importance to organizations as they become more knowledge centric and knowledge is 
considered an asset. The contribution of the GTU to EM is covered in areas such as 
complexity and decision making among others. In complexity, for instance, through 
insight drawn from the analysis of data it is shown that different people, within a 
problem situation, converge to seven levels of effort to understand. Effort to 
understand can be seen as a metric of how complex a problem is to a person. It is also 
shown that understanding is crucial to processes such as learning and decision making. 
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6 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
In conclusion, a review of the literature showed that a general case of understanding 
has not been established. To provide a solution, this dissertation presented a theory 
that explains the concept of understanding. The proposed general theory of 
understanding (GTU) explains what understanding is, what it does, how it does what it 
does, and why. The theory is consistent with accounts from epistemologists, cognitive 
science, education, and Al researchers. Additionally, it establishes new insights on 
understanding and on areas of interest to Engineering Management. The GTU defines 
understanding and provides outcomes of understanding. The outcomes of 
understanding are assignment of truth values to problems, generation of knowledge 
and generation of worldview. Given a new set of definitions, the GTU eliminates 
ambiguity found in the body of knowledge where descriptions of the concept are 
prevalent. Further, a disassociation from the widely used definition of understanding as 
'grasping' is emphasized. 
The GTU provides three schools of thought regarding understanding. KP-W 
reflects a person understanding a problem through knowledge application. In this case, 
a person applies her/his knowledge to a problem assuming that this application can be 
explained. This explanation amounts to a formulation of a solution. KW-P reflects a 
person understanding a problem through knowledge formulation. In this case, the 
person seeks to formulate, via worldview, her/his knowledge. This formulation will allow 
her/him to understand the problem at hand. Finally, (WP-K) reflects a person 
understanding a problem through the formulation of the problem. In this case, the 
person seeks to formulate, via worldview, the problem at hand. Two of these schools of 
thought, KP-W and KW-P, are found in the body of knowledge. KP-W is espoused by 
epistemologists, cognitive scientist and educational researchers. KW-P is espoused by Al 
researchers. WP-K is not found in the body of knowledge making it one of the main 
findings of this work. Through the GTU it is made clear and explicit that what was 
considered understanding is not one understanding, but three. 
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The GTU suggests metrics to subjectively assess understanding, one of them is 
effort to understand. Effort to understand is simply a counter that updates every time a 
person says s/he does not understand. As soon as the counter stops, it is a reflection of 
the person having understood the problem completely. Through the use of effort to 
understand it is shown that different understandings from different individuals converge 
to only seven levels of effort. These levels emerged from different initial conditions 
reflecting different individuals or different initial states within one individual. Levels 1 
through 4 reflect low effort to understand by an individual, levels 5 and 6 reflect a 
moderately high effort to understand compared to levels 1 through 4, and level 7 shows 
an extremely high effort to understand compared to previous levels. The GTU drew 
from this emergent outcome to generalize that the higher the effort the more complex 
the person considers the problem. The consideration of different understandings and 
different levels of effort is consistent with problem situations. From these seven levels, 
the GTU shows that accepted ideas, such as more elements imply more complexity are 
not the general case. It is shown that there are levels where there are large numbers of 
defined problems, yet the problems are understood with less effort. Moreover, the idea 
that more knowledge implies more understanding is shown not to be the case. It is 
shown that it is more about the balance and alignment of the number of different types 
of statements than about the number of statements. 
The GTU provides further insight into problem situations by considering the 
implications of shared understanding. It is shown that shared understanding is not only 
difficult but also not necessarily beneficial. Achieving shared understanding does not 
only need respective matching of knowledge, worldview, and problem to occur, but also 
"the matching of the matching" of different understanding among individuals need to 
occur. Unlike shared understanding, lack of shared understanding may be beneficial to 
decision making. In the hypothetical case when people share understanding it is implied 
that they share worldview as well. It is known that different perspectives are beneficial 
to group decision making. Ergo, lack of shared understanding should also be beneficial. 
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The GTU provides ways to differentiate perception, learning, decision making, 
and problem solving from understanding by seeing the connection of these processes as 
an autopoietic system. This system allows an individual to use and generate knowledge, 
worldview, and problem and through input-output of these parameters differentiate 
these processes from understanding, The GTU suggests that through sensing/intuition 
the person perceives reality and learns about knowledge, worldview, and problem. 
Understanding uses learnt knowledge, worldview, and problem and generates 
knowledge and worldview. Knowledge and worldview generated are used to act on 
problems, via problem solving or decision making, or simply learn. The enacted action 
changes reality generating knowledge and problem. With these changes learning occurs 
and understanding is revised. The revision of understanding, due to feedback, may 
change existing or new knowledge into a problem. This makes understanding a problem 
creation process. Finally, perception is constantly reshaped by understanding creating 
and revising worldview. 
Through the presented autopoietic process, the GTU provides insight into 
designing agents as highlighting main processes and the inputs and outputs of these 
processes. This suggests the development of possible alternatives of an agent's 
architecture design. Further, the characterization of understanding, presented by the 
GTU can be used in existing architecture of agents that have perception, learning and 
decision making capabilities. 
Lastly, the GTU provides a structured way to create theory out of theory using 
M&S, especially through the use of agents. This approach provides researchers with new 
ways of exploring poorly understood and complex phenomena opening the possibility to 
formalize soft topics that are usually conveyed through argumentative means. 
Future work in or using the concept of understanding within EM presents 
different options. Some of the suggested research questions, from short to long term, 
are: 
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• How can the Understanding Construct be used to improve decision 
making? Given that EM's areas of interest rest on the ability to make 
decisions, this question would seek insight into the details of how 
understanding affects decision making and how it can be used to make 
better decisions. This question also extends to defining the conditions 
needed to make decisions when full understanding is not feasible within 
an allocated amount of time. 
• Under what conditions is shared understanding good for group decision 
making? This question would seek insight into what conditions shared 
understanding is favorable and not favorable with regards to decision 
making and when those conditions should and should not be in place. It is 
hypothesized that shared understanding diminishes the effectiveness of 
decision making. Lack of shared understanding is hypothesized to be 
more beneficial to decision making given that it considers alternatives 
prompted by different understanding. 
• How does training need to be conducted to maximize understanding not 
only in terms of knowledge but also in terms of worldview? This question 
seeks insight into how trainers can maximize trainees' ability to make 
decisions under different conditions based on prompt knowledge 
evaluation and possibly worldview adjustment. 
• Does exposing trainees to conditions of high effort foster adaptation? If 
not, what fosters adaptation of knowledge and worldview? This is a 
follow up question to the previous bullet. This question seeks insight into 
how trainers can foster trainees' ability to adapt under different 
conditions. It is hypothesized that trainees trained under repeated high 
effort conditions will be able to switch worldview, for instance, when 
required. This is important for decision making given that if switching of 
worldview is considered, an individual may consider options obviated 
before. 
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Some of these questions can be approached through M&S, as done in this work 
or through experimentation depending on the access to data and ways of measuring 
observed constructs. In addition, some of these questions may be of interest to other 
disciplines such as Cognitive Science or M&S making them truly multidisciplinary if done 
in conjunction with engineering managers. 
Finally, the reason why future work is presented as research questions stems 
from the author's belief that any research endeavor ought to generate more questions 
than it started with. This provides growth potential for the body of knowledge in a 
particular discipline and material for future generations of researchers. Further, new 
questions should provide grounds for theoretical and empirical research advancement. 
In other words, a path for future theoretical development and hypothesis testing should 
be laid down. These reflections make future work indeed part of the contribution of any 
research to the body of knowledge. 
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D. DATA ANALYSIS 
Level 2 
The challenge for analysis that level 2 presents is that it contains more initial conditions. 










































































































































Table 21. Level 2 Initial Conditions 
What can immediately be observed is that, unlike level 1, in level 2, knowledge 
and worldview are not uniform in terms of settings (both knowledge and worldview 
have both settings, high and low). On the other hand, what makes this level similar to 
level 1 is that problem is still at low setting in all conditions. 
A Levene test was conducted for this level to establish homogeneity of variances 
for comparison purposes. However, according to the test, they variances are not 
homogeneous. A Tamhane's T2 test was then conducted in order to compare the 
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different conditions. The results of this test are in Appendix G. A plot of means for effort 





















Figure 39. Plot of Means Level 2 (Effort) 











Table 22. Levene Test for Level 2 (Effort) 
From the Tamhane's T2 test it can be observed that all initial conditions are 
equivalent with a few exceptions, namely, conditions 109 from 65, and 75 and 15 from 
65. These conditions are not equivalent given that they are placed at extreme levels 
from one another (see Figure 39). Taking conditions 3, 15, and 109 out (extreme lows) 
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and running the Tamhane's T2 test, the remaining conditions are statistically equivalent 
(results in Appendix H). 
As was done for level one, given that there is not another significantly close 
level, they are considered within the same level for assessment. Although most 
conditions are statistically equivalent, it can be observed that there is more difference 
from condition to condition than at level 1, which is consistent with the observation that 
the higher up in the level, the more variability in between means. 
From the assessment of level 1 it was concluded that a high knowledge setting is 
equivalent to high worldview setting. In this level, comparing conditions 3 and 5 and 
conditions 9 and 65, it can be concluded that having one type of knowledge high is 
equivalent to having the corresponding worldview type at a high setting. This implies 
that worldview is as important as knowledge when it comes to understanding and it 
should not be assumed or ignored. 
Comparing conditions 9 and 75 it can be concluded that more knowledge does 
not imply better understanding at this level either, given that these two conditions are 
statistically equivalent. 
Finally, WO is of no statistical impact at this level either. This is concluded after 
comparing conditions with same knowledge and/or worldview settings with low and 
high WO levels, namely, conditions 9 and 41, 5 and 37, 11 and 43, 71 and 103, 75 and 
107, 77 and 109, and 65 and 97. 
Now, as in level 1, in most conditions time is not normally distributed. For 
simplification purposes, non-parametric tests for all conditions are obviated. Instead, 
assessment is based on the data which is shown in Figure 40 and non-parametric tests 
run on the need to basis. Comparing Table 21 and Figure 40 shows that the conditions 
that take the most time are those that have a high setting on one type of knowledge or 
worldview (conditions 3, 5, 9, and 65) and WO is low. There is a mid level where the 
same setting takes place, but WO is high (35, 37, 43, and 97). Lastly, the conditions that 
take the least time are those that contain at least one type of knowledge and one type 
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Figure 40. Plot of Means for Level 2 (Time) 
Taking a closer look at conditions 71 and 103 that appear at the lower level and 
comparing them using a Mann-Whitney U Test (Table 23), it can be concluded that they 
are not statistically equivalent. This occurred regardless of their apparent proximity in 











a- Grouping Variable: VAR00002 
Table 23. Mann-Whitney U Test comparing Conditions 71 and 103 (Time) 
It can be concluded that not only does WO have a positive effect, as it did in level 
1, on understanding in terms of time but also a mix of knowledge and worldview setting. 
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Comparing condition 3 (level 2) with condition 1 (level 1), they are statistically 
equivalent. This means that more information (Ka equivalency) does not necessarily 











a- Grouping Variable: VAR 00002 
Table 24. Mann-Whitney U test comparing Conditions 1 and 3 (Time) 
Similar cases are found when comparing conditions 15 and 101, 47 and 101, and 
71 and 43 in KW-P. KW-P, unlike KP-W and WP-K does not depend on WO. In these 
cases it can be observed that higher settings do not mean faster times. This is shown in 
Table 25. The asymptotic significance when comparing conditions 15 and 71 < 0.05 what 
makes them not statistically equivalent. Further, Table 26 shows how condition 15, 











a- Grouping Variable: Type 













Sum of Ranks 
68630.00 
56620.00 
Table 26. Mann-Whitney Test Rank Table comparing Conditions 15 and 71 (Time) 
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Now, the comparison of the three types of understanding in terms of effort and 
time for level 2 is going to be based on their overall behavior. As in level 1, this is due to 
some conditions that are not normally distributed, for effort, and most of the conditions 
for time. Figure 41 and Figure 42 show the comparison among the three types for effort 
and time respectively. 
• 15 
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Figure 41 . Comparison of Means for KP-W, KW-P, and WP-K at Level 2 (Effort) 
As previously concluded for level 1, depending on the condition one type of 
understanding may perform better than the others in terms of effort and/or time. 
Unlike effort, the difference of means, in terms of time, is large. This says that even 
though conditions are equivalent in terms of effort, time needs to be considered if one 
were to obtain a way to make understanding more efficient. In terms of effort, there are 
10 cases where KW-P apparently is worse than its counterparts. Of this 10 cases, 11, 15, 
37, 43, 47, 71, 75, 77, 97, 107, and 109, half have high WO and the other half have low 
WO. Of the remaining 10, KP-W and WP-K apparently perform better under different 
139 
settings, KP-W mostly when WO is high, WP-K when WO is low. It is said mostly, because 
there are some exceptions. This highlights what was said before; it is about the 
combination of settings of factors when looking for who presents better understanding 
out of the three types. For instance, for condition 65 KW-P takes (apparently) both less 
effort and less time to reach understanding. On the other hand, for condition 71, WP-K 
effort is less, while taking more time than its counterparts (apparently). On condition 
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Figure 42. Comparison of Means for KP-W, KW-P, and WP-K at Level 2 (Time) 
Conducting a Tukey HSD test, it can be concluded that the three types of 
understanding are statistically the same in condition 65 and KP-W statistically different 
in condition 109 (Tables 27 and 28 respectively). Tukey HSD test was used because 





















Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
a- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 250.000. 




















Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
a- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 250.000. 
Table 28. Tukey HSD Test Comparing Condition 109 (Effort) 
Evaluating condition 109 in terms of time, a Kruskal-Wallis test shows that the 
three types of understanding are not statistically equivalent even though, they appear 
closer in terms of means. It can be extrapolated that for higher differences, the 










a Kruskal Wallis Test 
b- Grouping Variable: Type 
Table 29. Kruskal-Wallis Test comparing Condition 109 (Time) 
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Finally, KW-P, although it may take more effort in most cases, is the overall best 
in terms of time than its couterparts. 
This concludes the analysis of level 2. 
Level 3 
Level 3 presents a similar challenge for analysis than level 2. Unlike level 2, level 3 















































































































































































































































Table 30. Level 3 Initial Conditions 
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What can be immediately observed that makes these conditions different from 
level 1 and 2, is that problem is now a mix of settings between types in all cases (high 
and low). Like level 1, in level 3 there are conditions with only one type of either 
knowledge or worldview at high level (condition 10 for instance), and like level 2, there 
are conditions with at least one knowledge and one worldview type at high level 
(condition 14 for instance). What it is of even more interest is that condition 2 reflects 
all settings at low level, but one type of problem at high (Pp). Comparing condition 2 
from level 3 and condition 1 from level 1 it can be said that this individual found this 
problem more difficult. The same can be said as one goes up in terms of levels. Notice 
that a problem type is either high while the other remains low and vice versa. There are 
no instances of both being at high setting. 
Another behavior to notice is that the variation among means is more "erratic" 
than on the previous level. This can be seen when considering the Tamhane's T2 test in 
Appendix I. 
Whereas in level 2 there were only three conditions (3, 15, and 109) that were 
generating not comparable values, in level 3 there are at least eight conditions, namely 
2, 17, 34, 42, 49, 83, 100, and 115. These conditions are the upper extreme values as it 
can be observed in Figure 43. Excluding these extreme conditions, the remaining 
conditions are statistically equivalent (except for the pairs 61 and 80 and 68 and 80). 
This equivalency makes them comparable. So, in terms of effort, as it was mentioned, it 
is about the combination of factor settings what makes effort higher or lower. 
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Figure 44. Plot of Means for Level 3 (Time) 
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Figure 44 shows level 3 in terms of time. As can be seen, when moving towards 
high numbered conditions, understanding becomes more efficient. As in level 2, it 
appears that high settings are conducive to faster understanding. 
The three types of understanding, in terms of effort, are comparable. As in level 
2, KW-P appears to be the one that takes more effort. In terms of time, as it occurs in 
previous levels, KW-P appears to perform better than its counterparts in most 
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Figure 45. Comparison of Means for KP-W, KW-P, and WP-K at Level 3 (Effort) 
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Figure 46. Comparison of Means for KP-W, KW-P, and WP-K at Level 3 (Time) 
This concludes the analysis of level 3. 
Level 4 
Level 4 is similar to level 1 in the number of initial conditions and in the settings for 
knowledge, worldview, and WO. Unlike level 1, level 4 has all problem settings at high. 









































































Table 31. Level 4 Initial Conditions 
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Unlike previous levels, in level 4 about half of the conditions are not statistically 
equivalent. This can be observed in Figure 47 and it is confirmed by the Tamhane's T2 
test in Table 32. This is despite the closeness of the averages, which range from 521 to 
586. Conditions 62 and 84 suggest splitting the level in two, upper and lower values. 
Figure 47. Plot of Means for Level 4 (Effort) 
Multiple Comparisons 
Dependent Variable: Effort 
Tamhane 

























































































































































































































































































































































* The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
Table 32. Tamhane's T2 Test for Level 4 (Effort) 
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To discriminate between upper and lower values on level 4, a comparison of 
means is conducted on conditions 18, 50, 84, and 116. However, the F-test shows that 






















Table 33. F Test for Level 4 (Upper Values) 
It can be concluded without further tests, that most conditions in level 4 are not 
equivalent. In this case, the questions left to ask are: what is the effect of WO or do high 
settings make a difference in terms of effort. From the Tamhane's T2 test, comparing 
conditions 18 and 50, it can be concluded that the two are statistically equivalent 
rendering WO, in this case, of no impact in terms of effort. Comparing conditions 62 and 
128 it can be concluded that high settings do not play a role in terms of effort either in 
this particular case. 
This level shows an insight previously mentioned: 
• High problem setting does not imply a more "complex" problem. This is just 
level 4, in terms of effort, which means that there are other 3 levels that take 
more effort in terms of understanding. Despite low settings on knowledge, 
worldview, and WO, effort is low compared to levels 5, 6, and 7. 
Figure 48 shows the plot of means for level 4 in terms of time. It can be observed 
that level 4 has an overall behavior similar to level 1 and level 3; an almost distinctive 
power graph that as knowledge, worldview, and WO goes higher in settings, the closer it 
gets to zero. 
149 
£ 30000 A 
0 18 
O50 






Figure 48. Plot of Means for Level 4 (Time) 
A Tamhane's T2 test was conducted and it is shown in Table 34. 
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Multiple Comparisons 









































































































































*• The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
Table 34. Tamhane's T2 Test for Normally Distributed Conditions in Level 4 (Time) 
Table 34 shows that these five conditions are not statistically equivalent. All that 
can be said is that they are different and that the higher the value, the more time it 
takes to reach understanding. 
Comparing the three types of understanding in terms of effort and time (Figure 
49 and Figure 50 respectively), it can be observed that the previous insights of one type 








































































Figure 50. Comparison of Means for KP-W, KW-P, and WP-K at Level 4 (Time) 
This concludes the analysis of level 4. 
Level 5 

































































































































Table 35. Level 5 Initial Conditions 
Level 5 distinguishing characteristics are: 
• There is one high knowledge setting per condition, not both. All previous 
levels had conditions where knowledge had both types at high settings. 
• Problem settings are all low or a mix of high and low. This is truly a 
combination of problem setting from previous levels. 
• Worldview settings are low or a mix of high and low. It is the same behavior 
than knowledge. 
• More importantly, when problem settings are at low, knowledge and 
worldview settings both coincide at high or low setting on either type 
(conditions 7, 39, 73, and 105). 
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• When one problem setting is high, two cases occur: first where one 
corresponding knowledge type and one corresponding worldview type are 
high (conditions 23, 55, 74, and 106). The other, where one corresponding 
knowledge or worldview is paired up with a non corresponding knowledge or 
worldview type (conditions 12, 27, 44, 59, 70, 85,102, and 117). 
Appendix K shows that Tamhane's T2 test for level 5, excluding conditions 55 and 
105 because they are not normally distributed. However, conditions 55 and 105 are 
considered within the group for overall assessment. 
From Appendix K two forms of grouping are possible; however, one provides a 
particular separation on two groups. One group contains conditions 27, 44, 59, 70, 85, 
102, and 117 and the other conditions 7, 12, 23, 39, 73, 74, and 106. These groupings 
separate those conditions with high problem setting with the paired up corresponding 
knowledge or worldview type with non corresponding knowledge or worldview type as 
one group (with the exception of condition 12). The second group is formed by those 
conditions with coinciding knowledge and worldview type regardless of problem setting. 
Condition 12 does not belong to the first group because it takes less effort. This is due to 
the availability of proper worldview when the KP match first occurs despite the high 
likelihood of initial mismatches due to high numbers of Ka and Pp. This is 
counterintuitive, especially when compared with condition 27. Condition 27 has, 
apparently, the perfect initial setting to deal with the problem (Ka at high for Pa at high). 
However, do consider that Wp is at high level generating many mismatches which 
amounts to high effort. On condition 12, it happens the other way around; there are few 
initial mismatches due to the low Ka. 
Figure 51 shows this level. The upper values correspond to the first group while 
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Figure 51. Plot of Means for Level 5 (Effort) 
The previously mentioned characteristics mean: 
• For group one, a problem with one high setting that is matched with non 
corresponding knowledge or worldview type at high settings, will 
correspond to a lower degree of effort (compared to group 2). Also 
notice that at this level it is much more evident the fact that higher 
setting levels does not imply less effort. Comparing conditions 27 and 17 
(from level 3), for instance, the former takes more effort regardless of 
higher knowledge and worldview settings with the same problem and 
WO setting. This is evidence that complexity, viewed from an 
understanding perspective, is about the mismatch of types more than the 
high settings of problem and/or of WO. On the following levels this 
mismatch is taken gradually to the extreme, making for extreme efforts 
to understand. Furthermore, there are conditions that are at low setting, 
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(condition 73 for instance), take more effort than counterparts with 
higher problem setting and similar knowledge and worldview 
combinations (condition 84). This implies that complexity does not 
necessarily depend on the higher problem setting. 
• Group two, formed by those conditions with coinciding knowledge and 
worldview type regardless of problem setting, take more effort due to 
the matching of high knowledge and worldview setting when problem is 
at low setting, and the matching of high knowledge and worldview 
setting with one of problem setting at high because it corresponds to the 
type at high setting of knowledge and worldview. 
• From both groups, intuitive possible outcomes may not be true after all. 
Each condition, within a type of understanding must be evaluated. 
• Finally, when considering better understanding, it is not only about taking 
into account what conditions to seek but also what conditions to avoid. 
The higher the level, the more aware an individual needs to be in order to 
avoid higher effort. 
Figure 52 shows the means in terms of time. The behavior of time at this level is 
similar to that of level 2, apparently erratic. It is not like the other levels (besides 2) 
where, as it was mentioned, the higher the knowledge and worldview setting and WO, 
the closer to zero in terms of time. This is because knowledge and worldview exist at 
similar settings. WO helps in the variation of the means. The inherent purpose of this 
analysis, as before, was to have an idea on the effect of WO. However, all cases where 
WO is at high perform better than at low setting. Take for instance conditions 12 and 44 
take look apparently in close proximity to one another. Conducting a Mann-Whitney 
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a- Grouping Variable: Condition 
Table 36. Mann-Whitney Test comparing Conditions 12 and 44 at Level 5 (Time) 
To have an idea of the effect of time, it is better to use KW-P given that it does 
not depend on WO. Figure 53 shows the plot of means for level 5 in terms of time. As it 
can be observed, unlike Figure 52, Figure 53 shows a clear difference between the two 
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Figure 53. Plot of Means for KW-P at Level 5 (Time) 
Table 37 shows the results of the Kruskal-Wallis Test comparing the conditions 
within group 1 (including condition 12). The test shows that the conditions within group 









a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
D- Grouping Variable: Condition 
Table 37. Kruskal-Wallis Test for Group 1 at Level 5 (Time) 
This is an interesting development, especially when compared to effort. For 
instance, Table 37 says that condition 12 and condition 27 are equivalent in terms of 
time, but they could not be more different in terms of effort (see Appendix K). 
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This is an interesting change of events in the sense that up to this point, 
conditions for effort usually behave similarly while time is not. Here, both provide equal 
elements for comparison and insight generation. 
Table 38 shows the results of the Kruskal-Wallis Test comparing the conditions 









a. Kruskal WallisTest 
b. Grouping Variable: Condition 
Table 38. Kruskal-Wallis Test for Group 2 at Level 5 (Time) 
Unlike the analysis of time in previous levels that focused on higher settings as 
compared to lower settings, the focus here is on the combination of settings. For 
instance, comparing conditions 23 and 27; problem has the same setting, what changes 
is the high number of the type of worldview. Also, comparing the same conditions in 
terms of effort and time, it is shown that what may be beneficial in terms of effort it is 
not in terms of time and vice versa. 
Figure 54 shows the means comparison of the three types of understanding in 
























































Figure 54. Comparison of Means for KP-W, KW-P, and WP-K at Level 5 (Effort) 
As in previous levels, if one is to consider which is the best type, one must look 
into each individual case to seek the best condition or avoid the worse ones within the 
level. 
Figure 55 shows the means comparison in terms of time. As in previous levels, 
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Figure 55. Comparison of Means for KP-W, KW-P, and WP-K at Level 5 (Time) 
This concludes the analysis of level 5. 
Level 6 
Level 6 is perhaps the most challenging level for analysis because of the large number of 























































































































































































































































































Table 39. Level 6 Initial Conditions 
As was the case in level 5, level 6 weighs more heavily the combination than the 
high settings of knowledge and worldview to generate more effort. At this point, an 
individual falls into the case of knowing "too much" of the wrong type of problem 
increasing the likelihood of using this type of knowledge and/or a type of worldview 
inappropriately. This situation, as can be seen, is more detrimental than having a 
problem at high setting or what it could be considered a "more complex" problem. 
These cases are those where an individual attempts to use knowledge about structure 
on a problem about behavior, or use knowledge about behavior on a problem about 
behavior with a worldview about structure. 
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Appendix L contains a Tamhane's T2 test on level 6 excluding conditions 4 and 6 
because they are not normally distributed. However, conditions 4 and 6 are considered 
within this level for assessment purposes. 
Tamhane's T2 test shows there is overlapping of conditions creating the 
possibility of many categorizations within the level. However, if categorizations were to 
be established there are conditions that would no abide by one category only. As can 
be seen in the test, one condition may belong to at least two different groupings. This 
impedes the generalization from the categorization. For this reason, there is no 
suggested grouping. This is paradoxical; suggested grouping may miss important 
combinations, and without grouping there is no way of establishing generalizations 
within the level. In addition, there are many possible explanations for the differentiation 
of categories. For instance, condition 20 more likely belongs to this level because of the 
opposite types of K and P. Condition 25, on the other hand, more likely belongs to this 
level because of the low K. All that can be said about the conditions of this level is that if 
they are equivalent different explanations may not make them comparable. 
Figure 56 shows how a condition may be belong to different sub-groups within 
the level. Figure 56 also highlights the seemingly "erratic" behavior previously 
mentioned as the means vary greatly in values. This variation is what creates the 
different possible groupings. 
This is an important finding; the fact that at this level no generalization within a 
level is possible further reassures the need to consider each condition separately. 
What can be generalized from all groups is that the combination of extreme 
conditions may prompt an individual to see the problem situation as more complex due 
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Figure 56. Plot of Means for Level 6 (Effort) 
Focusing on time, the same behavior presented at level 5 can be observed: two 
clear groupings based on efficiency (Figure 57). As was the case for level 5, in this level 
better time does not mean less effort. Consider condition 4; in terms of time present a 
high value whereas in terms of effort is the second lowest value. Condition 16, on the 
other hand, is low in both time and effort (the lowest value). On the same token, 
condition 114 is high in both time and effort. In other words, each condition must be 
evaluated for time and effort and seek the one with better result while avoiding the 
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Figure 57. Plot of Means for KW-P at Level 6 (Time) 
Figure 58 and Figure 59 show the comparison of means for effort and time 
respectively. As previously mentioned, whereas some conditions may be equivalent, 
some may not. Each condition needs to be evaluated individually if one needs to decide 
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Figure 58. Comparison of Means for KP-W, KW-P, and WP-K at Level 6 (Effort) 
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Figure 59. Comparison of Means for KP-W, KW-P, and WP-K at Level 6 (Time) 
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Although in terms of output there is no clear generalization, in terms of input 
there is. There are five groupings based on input: 
• Group 1: One high setting of knowledge or worldview and one type of 
problem at high setting (1,1). 
• Group 2: One high setting of knowledge or worldview and problem at 
high setting (1, 2). 
• Group 3: Two high setting of either knowledge, or worldview, or one and 
one and problem at high (2, 2). 
• Group 4: Three high setting of knowledge and worldview (two and one or 
one and two) and one type of problem at high setting (3,1). 
• Group 5: Three high setting of knowledge and worldview (two and one or 
one and two) and one problem at high setting (3, 2). 
These groupings, however, do not correspond to similar outputs. In other words, 
an individual within group 2 can be equivalent to an individual within group 5 such as 
the case of conditions 82 and 92 respectively (see appendix L). 
This concludes the analysis of level 6. 
Level 7 
The difference between level 7 and the rest is significant. This means that the 
combinations of this level present certainly the most difficult challenge an individual 











































































Table 40. Level 7 Initial Conditions 
As level 1, this is a very straightforward case: the existence of one problem type 
at high setting (alpha or beta) and the opposite type of knowledge at high setting with 
the high setting of the corresponding worldview to the knowledge type. What this 
combination does is that when a mismatch of knowledge and problem occurs it gets 
exacerbated by the high setting of the worldview. 
This shows two groupings based on input: 2, 1 (one type of knowledge and one 
type of worldview at high setting with one type of problem at high setting) and 2, 2 (one 
type of knowledge and one type of worldview at high setting with problem at high 
setting). Group 2,2 from level 7 and 6 are quite different. The one corresponding to level 
6 is one type of knowledge at high and the opposite worldview at high as well with 
problem at high. The one corresponding to level 7 is one type of knowledge at high and 
the corresponding type of worldview at high with problem at high. In other words, for 
level 7, corresponding knowledge and worldview types do not work on the problem at 
hand. For level 6, there are not corresponding knowledge and worldview types. This 
allows balancing the problem out when at high setting. 
Table 41 shows that the variances are homogeneous. Tukey HSD was then 
conducted to establish which conditions where statistically equivalent. However, like 
level 6, level 7 does not present a clear grouping based on the output (Table 42). 
Instead, four variable groupings are shown with no indication of how one is similar to 
the other. Two groups contain five variables whereas the other two contain three. From 
level 1 to 5, it was found that these groupings worked in even numbers which made 
easier generalizing from the output. This is not the case for level 6 and 7. In addition, 
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notice conditions 8, 24, and 40. They are not statistically equivalent. However, WO is the 
same for 8 and 24, but not for 40. Even though WO is the same for 8 and 24, both have 
different problem setting. All that can be said is that the behavior seems erratic and that 
each condition needs to be evaluated independently to see if equivalence with other 
condition can be established. 



























































Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed. 
a- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 250.000. 
Table 42. Tukey HSD Comparing Conditions for Level 7 
Figure 60 shows the plot of means for this level. 
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Figure 60. Plot of Means for Level 7 (Effort) 
Figure 61 shows the plot of means in terms of time. Unlike effort, and like level 
6, time in level 7 provides a distinguishable pattern. However, it is not a new pattern; it 
shows that WO has an effect on understanding. As in all cases, it shows that a high WO 
takes less time that a low WO. 
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Figure 61. Plot of Means for Level 7 (Time) 
As before, to have an idea about the behavior of understanding through time, it 
is better to look at KW-P given that it does not depend on WO. Figure 62 shows the plot 
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Figure 62. Plot of Means for KW-P at Level 7 (Time) 
Figure 62 shows what seems like uneven groupings: conditions 24, 56, and 89 
with low values and conditions 8, 40, 90, 121, and 122 with high values. However, 
conducting a Kruskal-Wallis test, it can be concluded that they all are statistically 









a. Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Condition 
Table 43. Kruskal-Wallis Test for Level 7 (Time) 
Figure 63 shows the comparison of means for effort. KW-P seems to perform 
worse than its counterparts. As previously mentioned, whereas some conditions may be 
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equivalent, some may not. Each condition needs to be evaluated individually if one 














































Figure 63. Comparison of Means for KP-W, KW-P, and WP-K at Level 7 (Effort) 
Taking condition 8 as an example, it can be seen how KP-W (Type 1) and WP-K 
(Type 3) are statistically equivalent. In this case, as is the case of all this level, KW-P 
(Type 2) performs worse than its counterparts (see Table 44). 
Effort 















Means for groups in homogeneous subsets are displayed, 
a- Uses Harmonic Mean Sample Size = 250.000. 
Table 44. Tukey Test comparing Condition 8 (Effort) 
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Figure 64 shows the comparison of means for time. As before, KW-P seems to 
perform better than its counterparts in most conditions. Evaluating condition 56, for 
instance, it can be concluded that the three types of understanding are statistically 
different (Table 45). However, looking at the rank table (Table 46), it can be observed 
that KP-W and WP-K's ranks are close. Conducting a Mann-Whitney U Test for KP-W and 
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a- Kruskal Wallis Test 
b. Grouping Variable: Type 




























a- Grouping Variable: Type 
Table 47. Mann-Whitney Test comparing KP-W and KW-P for Condition 56 (Time) 
As previously mentioned, one must evaluate what is the most desired output, 
depending on the input, if one is to simulate what better understanding is like. 
This concludes the analysis of level 7. 
WO Threshold 
WO has been of great use in considering the dynamism of problem conditions: low level 
being more dynamic than high level given that the chance to understand it is shorter. It 
has been clear, in terms of time, the impact that WO has on the output. What is not 
clear is when WO does not play a role. Initially it was thought that this was a case of a 
threshold. However, it is more a case of converging towards a value. Figure 65 shows 
the means for WO, running from condition 15 (5 time units) and passing by condition 47 
(95 time units). The means are based on 30 runs per condition, increasing WO by one 
time unit until WO equals 160 time units (corresponding data is in Appendix M). 
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Figure 65. WO for Condition 15, from 5 to 160 Time Units 
Figure 65 is not conclusive regarding the effect of WO as it grows higher. 
However, it can be speculated that: 
• The convergence point is around 1200-1300 time units. 
• There is a lot of variance between means. More runs per conditions may 
be needed to alleviate the effect of outliers. 
A deeper analysis of WO is outside of the scope of this work, and it is considered 
for future work. 
176 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































F. LEVENE AND F TESTS FOR CONDITIONS 1,13, AND 99 RESPECTIVELY 

































































































G. TAMHANE'S T2 TEST FOR LEVEL 2 (EFFORT) 
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H. TAMHANE'S T2 TEST EXCLUDING CONDITIONS 3,15, AND 109 
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I. TAMHANE'S T2 TEST FOR LEVEL 3 (EFFORT) 
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